契約融資 的英文怎麼說

中文拼音 [qìyāoróngzī]
契約融資 英文
contract financing
  • 約 : 約動詞[口語] （用秤稱） weigh
  • 融 : Ⅰ動詞1 （融化） melt; thaw 2 （融合; 調和） blend; fuse; be in harmony Ⅱ形容詞[書面語]1 （長遠; ...
  • 資 : Ⅰ名詞1 （錢財; 費用） money; wealth; expenses 2 （資質） intelligence; endowment 3 （資格） quali...
  • 融資 : finance
  1. Chapter 3 studies how contractual savings influences capital market, and analyzes the mechanism and condition of the influence. chapter 4 discusses the retroaction of capital market on contractual savings

    第四章從兩者互動關系的另一個層面，資本市場的反作用角度探討資本市場對契約型儲蓄金融機構的制約及機制，以及形成制約的條件。
  2. In 1958, two economist modigliani and miller proposed famous mm theory. they argued that capital structure has no effect on enterprise value in the completely competitive capital market later on, many papers about enterprise finance have analyzed capital structure in terms of tax capital cost agency cost and incomplete contract because completely competitive market does not exist in reality, capital structure has particular function on interior message stimulation mechanism and control righto this article just discusses these aspects, that is, studies governance structure reform in terms of capital theory

    1958年，兩位經濟學家modigliani和miller提出了著名的mm理論，其大意是，在完全競爭的資本市場上，企業的資本結構不影響企業的價值。此後，許多有關企業金融的文獻分別從稅收、資金成本、代理成本、不完全契約等方面對企業資本結構的設計和功能進行了分析。由於完全競爭的資本市場在現實中並不存在，資本結構在向外部的投資者顯示企業內部的信息、決定控制權的安排及提供激勵等方面，都有其特殊的功能，從而影響乃至決定企業的價值。
  3. In the main body, it firstly analyzes the microscopically mechanisms of vc ' s engender - contract mechanism, which is also the basic system of vc ' s further development. with other analytical tools like company bonds, corporation shares, the formation of venture investment ( vi ) contracts and relative breaching problems in the asymmetric information environment are also discussed

    本文以理論文獻綜述部分引領全文，首先分析了風險資本形成的微觀機制基礎? ?契約機制，利用了企業債券、股權等作為分析工具，研究了不對稱信息下，多金融工具框架體系中的風險投資契約形式及違約問題，這是風險資本形成的機制基礎。
  4. In chapter 9 we summarize the whole paper, and explain the shortages of this paper and problems to further study. main conclusions of this paper are as follows : the first, state - owned funds have always been predominant in venture capital sources in china, and this caused the " government - operated model " which leads to excessive government ' s interferes and distorted venture capital contracts ; the second, limited partnership contract is better than incorporated company contract, because the former has obvious advantages in not only encouragement and controls, but also in investors " profits. however, this paper insists, incorporated company contracts will still be very popular in the near future because limited partnership still be illegal in most provinces of china ; the third, venture capitalists " share of profits in compensation clause of fundraising contracts is influenced by investors " attitude towards difficulties and obstacles of future investment

    本文研究的主要結論：第一，在我國風險資本來源中，政府風險資本一直居於主導地位，這造就了我國風險投資的「官辦官營」模式，使其契約機制從一開始就帶有「行政干預」的烙印；第二，有限合夥契約在約束機制、激勵機制、投資者收益三個方面都明顯優于公司制契約，因此是我國風險融資契約的發展方向，但由於有限合夥在我國受到法律限制，公司制契約在一定時期內仍是我國風險融資契約的主要形式；第三，融資契約報酬條款中的激勵系數受主體先驗概率影響，借鑒有限合夥契約，可對我國公司制融資契約進行改造與重構；第四，與債權契約、普通股契約相比，可轉換優先股契約可以有效緩解風險投資過程中的信息不對稱、降低代理成本，因此是我國風險投資契約的最優選擇。
  5. The paper holds the opinion that the interaction between contractual savings and capital market is decided by some immanent factors and is the logical r esult of these factors. the essentials of their benign relation are founded on the harmonious relation among economic development, financial development and demographic transition

    論文通過研究得出了契約型儲蓄金融機構與資本市場之間的互動具有必然性，要使得兩者形成良性的互動，實質上就是要實現人口結構、金融深化與經濟發展之間協調發展的核心觀點。
  6. This agency issue of investor and venture capitalist can be effective to guard against the morals hazard of venture capitalist by limited partnership system ; venture capitalist can guard against the morals hazard of entrepreneur through contract ， which is optimal capital - structure contract in financing decision ， is combining to equity fraction ， stock design and staging finance ， in order to make enterprise financing cost minimum ， profit maximum ， it is minimum that informational asymmetries " level fall to

    在投資者與風險資本家這一級委託代理關系中，有限合夥制可以有效防範風險資本家的道德風險；風險資本家可以通過與風險企業訂立契約來防範第二級代理問題? ?企業家的道德風險，即在融資決策中尋求最優的資本結構契約，在這種契約中結合股權比例，證券組合，分階段投資等方法，以使企業融資成本最低、收益最大，信息不對稱程度降到最小。
  7. Due to the barrier of idea and institution, technology reform and economic development are not synchronous. for a long period of time, because of the unconnected financing channels, unsound contractual relationships, unreasonable distribution system and the undefined intellectual property rights, risk investment developed difficultly in our country. some corporations have even gone wrong and gone bankrupt at last

    我國的風險投資業發展較晚，由於觀念及體制上的障礙，科技改革與經濟發展未能保持同步，長期以來融資渠道的不通暢、契約關系的不健全、分配製度的不合理、知識產權不明確等原因，致使我國風險投資事業舉步維艱，有些公司甚至誤入歧途，最終破產關閉。
  8. The rights of the minority investors are defined by the financing contract signed between them and the stock publishers

    中小投資者的權益是通過中小投資者與證券發行人之間簽訂的融資契約來界定的。
  9. The professionals of ours have successfully arranged over $ 1. 5 billion in financing including : senior secured debt, unsecured debt, equipment leasing, mezzanine financing, private institutional equity, etc

    15億的金融投資包括：高級擔保之債、非擔保之債、固定資產契約、夾層資本、私有機構股份。
  10. The behavior of investment and finance in venture capital involves the dual principal - agent relationships. there is the relationship between investors and venture capitalists and the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs ， which is described by a branch of the theories of the neo - institutional economics

    本文以新制度經濟學中的一個重要分支? ?契約經濟學理論為立論基礎來分析風險投資中的投、融資行為涉及的投資者、風險資本家、企業家的三者之間的關系，他們構成雙重委託? ?代理關系。
  11. Conflicts of interests in debt financing contracts

    論債務融資契約中的利益沖突及其治理
  12. This paper is base on contract theory and modern financial theory, use normative study and field study method to analyze the pecking order of state - owned listed company in china

    本文以契約理論和現代財務理論為基礎，運用規范研究與實地研究的方法對我國國有上市公司的融資順序進行研究。
  13. Embarking from the incompleteness of the financing contracts, this article considers all the factors influencing the minority investor protection in a contract theory ’ s framework, the factors including law, reputation, market intermediary organs, shareholding structure, and market competition

    本文從融資契約不完全的角度出發，把法律、信譽、市場中介組織、股權結構、市場競爭等影響中小投資者權益保護的因素統一在了契約理論的框架內。
  14. For the existence of contracts " incompleteness, convertible securities, convertible bonds and convertible preferred stocks, are frequently used, accompanying with the unique corporate governance of the vc backed companies

    為解決契約的不完備，風險投資主要採用的金融工具是可轉換公司證券（可轉債及優先股） ，並形成了創業企業獨特的公司治理機制。
  15. Afterwards, the author analyses concretely the contract handling with information asymmetry, especially the exertion of convertible securities ( cs ) and stage financing

    接著，作者具體分析了創業資本應對信息失稱的契約安排，尤其是可轉換先股和分階段融資體系的具體運用。
  16. The article adopts the theoretical study, practical observation and empirical research together, by the means of statistical analysis, comparative analysis, structure analysis etc., to undertake the research on the financing structure problems of the listed companies in our country on the base of efficiency characteristic of economic resource allocation. the research divided into six chapters, and has got lots of useful achievements

    文章主要採用理論研究、實踐考察與實證分析相結合的方法，通過統計分析、比較分析、結構分析等手段，抓住資本市場的資源配置效率特徵，結合產權理論、制度經濟學理論、信息經濟理論、契約理論等相關理論研究的成果，分六章對我國上市公司融資結構問題進行研究。
  17. This paper suggests that the financing breach is derived from the bank credit ration produced by the serious information asymmetry of small and medium - sized enterprises, diversified risk allocation mechanism and financing strategy produced by risk grade inconsistency, and credit risk produced by imperfect contacts

    本文在對中小企業存在的融資缺口（資本融資缺口和債務融資缺口）的現實狀況進行分析的基礎上，指出中小企業嚴重的信息非均衡所導致的銀行信貸配給、風險等級不一致所要求的多樣化的風險分擔機制和融資策略及契約的不完善所導致的信用風險是產生融資缺口的根本原因。
  18. As different financial contracts, equity contracts and debt contracts have different internal request on the structure of corporate governance and play a great role on the allocation and matching of firm ' s residual claims and residual control rights

    作為不同的金融契約，股權和債權融資契約對公司治理結構有不同的內生要求，在一定程度上決定著企業控制權和剩餘索取權的效率配置。
  19. Through an empirical testing of the relationship between the implicit contracts and the capital structure, this paper has an analysis of the impact of the implicit contracts on enterprises ' financing strategies and then draws a conclusion that the proportion of specialized assets and the fulfillment of the clients ' implicit debts have a significant impact on enterprises ' capital structure

    通過隱性契約與資本結構關系實證檢驗，分析了隱性契約對企業融資政策的影響，得出結論：專用性資產比重以及對顧客隱性負債的履行對企業資本結構產生顯著影響。
  20. Non - contractual financing and the transfer of control rights in china ' s private firms

    我國私營企業的非契約融資與控制權轉移
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