控股利益 的英文怎麼說
中文拼音 [kònggǔlìyì]
控股利益
英文
controlling interests-
Through the analysis contrapose to the reason which causes the problem and commercial banks governing structure in different families of law, the article poses out ; establishing wide administrating right to corporation affairs by directorate, avoiding that state - owned stock holders intervene decision - making in the bank, reinforcing the benefit protection of stock - holders and others who are related to it, paying more attention to remold with commercial state banks board of supervisors by enlarging its authority, and perfecting its financial supervising and strengthen promoting system etc
通過對產生問題的原因和對兩大法系商業銀行治理結構的分析,本文提出:確立董事會對公司事務廣泛的管理權,防止國有控制股東干預銀行經營決策;加強對股東及利益相關者的利益保護;採取擴大監事會職權,完善監事會的財務監督和加強激勵機制等手段著重改造國有商業銀行的監事會。The author suggests that our country should perfect the preemptive right of shareholders to subscribe to new share in order to protect the proportional benefits of shareholders in company ; meanwhile the rigid disinvestment system should be improved. at last the responsibilities of directors for increasing and decreasing company ' s capital illegally should be strengthened in order to make shareholders treated equitably and prevent directors from fighting for controlling power of company and other personal benefits
之後指出,我國應完善股東的新股認購權制度,以保護股東在公司的比例性利益; 7t化的減資制度應予改善,對因虧損而減資,不必設置債揪異議程序,為餓東在公司增減資本中獲得公平的橢,防止董事藉此爭奪公司控制權或謀取其他私利,應強化董事在公司違法增減資本中的責任。It doesn ’ t only meet the need of the shareholders who are controlling the corporation indeed, but also protect the dissentient shareholders, who are helpless in self - protection and want to get their money back legally, the system of the appraisal right of dissentient shareholders is the final protection
為了適應經濟發展,追求決策效率, 「資本多數決原則」成為公司法的普遍原則。然而在缺乏有效的監督和制衡機制的情況下,多數股東往往濫用控制地位,侵害中小股東利益。The national sole proprietorship company adapt to apply stockholder administration pattern. at the same time, co - administration pattern of those correlated with profits is suitable for the state - owned proprietary company
指出國有獨資公司宜採用股東治理模式,相對于國有獨資公司而言, 「利益相關者共同治理模式」更適用於國有控股公司。In present dissertation, most stirpses are repartitioned and redefined, and the structure characteristic, course of formation, cause of formation, function and risk of stirpses are analyzed. the main conclusions are : [ 1 ] rapid development of corporations engenders urgent demand of financing, conflict between capital market imperfection and demand of financing leads corporations to control listed corporations by purchasing " shell " and enhance it ' s financing capability ; [ 2 ] two kinds of pricing institution of stock provides stirpses for controlling listed corporations by low cost, monitoring institution imperfections provides corporations for operating listed corporations. adjust of national assets provides more " shells " ; [ 3 ] more private corporations purchase listed corporations, some of them form stirpses ; [ 4 ] stirpses have positive influence about adjusting industry and enhancing capital market financing function ; [ 5 ] stirpses magnify financial risk by controlling listed corporations, and transform listed corporations from shareholders benefit to block shareholder benefit, having tendency of infracting shareholders benefit
本文主要的結論: [ 1 ]中國企業的迅速發展對融資有迫切的要求,中國國內資本市場發展不完善與這種強烈的融資需求的沖突導致了企業尋求通過買「殼」的方式控制上市公司,以此來提高自身的融資能力; [ 2 ]中國上市公司股票的兩種定價機制為「系」低成本控制上市公司提供了可能,監管機制的不完善為「系」提供了操縱上市公司的空間,國有資產在調整過程中從部分競爭行業退出,為資本市場提供了一定數量的「殼」資源; [ 3 ]民營企業紛紛買「殼」上市,在這個過程中,部分實力突出的企業形成了「系」 ; [ 4 ] 「系」現象對進行行業整合、提高資本市場融資能力等方面起到了積極的作用; [ 5 ] 「系」通過對上市公司進行的操縱放大了金融風險,將上市公司的股東利益最大化變為大股東利益最大化,存在著侵害小股東利益的潛在傾向。However, with the controling share being kept in the hands of state government or institutional shareholders, independent directors find that they are actually underplayed roles in boardrooms and their confined atonomy and monitoring function can not stop some majority stockholders from engaging in self - interest serving and infringing minority stokholders ’ interests
中國上市公司的國家股和法人股占據了絕大份額,而占絕對控股權的大股東就擁有了對公司的絕對控制權,獨立董事在董事會中的制衡作用卻收效甚微,這就為大股東謀求不正當利益提供了便利。Along with the gradual separation of ownership and managing right, agency has become a necessary trend ; and at the same time, the comedown of the centralism of the shareholder ' s annual general meeting, the spring - up of board of directors, interior commanding and manager ' s damage to owner ' s benefit have come into being
隨著公司所有權和經營權的逐步分離,委託代理成為必然趨勢;同時, 「股東會中心主義」衰落, 「董事會中心主義」開始興起,內部人控制、經營者損害所有者利益的現象相伴而行。Faced with this situation, in the corporate governance structure of the west introduced the system of independent directors china ' s listed companies since august 21, 2001, the china securities regulatory commission promulgated the " on the establishment of independent directors of listed companies in the guidance system ", marks the beginning of our independent directors in listed companies to implement the system. 。 introduction of the system of independent directors of listed companies, mainly in view of the existence of our company ' s management structure is too centralized, decentralized and public shareholders too weak force ; control of the controlling shareholders, led to the independence is not strong, decision - making, oversight functions properly ; the board of supervisors fail to controlling shareholders, supervision of the board of serious adverse internal control phenomenon
獨立董事是英美公司治理模式的特色制度,其在制衡控股股東或內部人的控制權濫用,捍衛董事會的獨立性,促進公司可持續發展以及保障股東整體利益等方面卓有成效。獨立董事制度已經實施多年,獨立董事已經擺脫當年設立時勢單力薄的劣勢,在現階段能對上市公司進行有力的決策干預,其干預的成效如何,本文用實證的觀點去看待獨立董事制度對中國上市公司盈餘方面的影響,從而揭示獨立董事制度發展多年以來的成效,並根據時代發展,提出需要改進的地方The owners ( shareholders ) and the executives of a business are principals and agents. therefore, there are so called " agency problems " between them, such as " different objectives and interests ", " disproportional control of information ", and " disproportional responsibilities and risks "
企業的所有者(股東)和企業的經營者之間的關系,是委託人和代理人的關系,這樣,在兩者之間就存在「目標利益不一致」 , 「信息控制不對稱」 , 「責任風險不對稱」的所謂的「代理問題」 。The relationships among different shareholders, especially the agent relationships between the outside shareholders and the dominant shareholders ( or the board dominated by them ), are the start point and the determinant element for other types of agent relationships in a company. therefore, the corporate governance should commence with the inner - shareholders governance. that is to say that we should put the focus on finding the solution to the interests conflicts between outside shareholders and dominant shareholders ( or board of directors ) and resolve the agent problem between them
股東資產是公司存在的首要前提,股東權益是公司的權益之源,股東之間的相互關系,尤其是外部股東和控制型大股東(或受其控制的董事會)之間的代理關系就成為公司中其它類型代理關系的起點和和決定性因素,從而,公司治理的出發點應當放在股東的內部治理上,即解決外部股東與控制型大股東(或董事會)之間的利益沖突和代理問題。This thesis mainly used the methods of comparable investigation and comprehensive analyze to make a preliminary research : shareholders derivative suit refers to such a suit : when a company ' s legitimate rights and interests are infringed upon by other people, especially the people having control powers, such as shareholders, parent company, directors and management personnel, and, while the company is slack to exercise its litigation rights, the shareholder being up to the standard can institute a proceeding to the infringer for the sake of company ' s rights and interests by his / her own name to holder the infringer subject to legal liabilities
本文主要運用比較研究和綜合分析的方法,對以下問題進行了初步的探討:派生訴訟指當公司的正當權益受到他人侵害時,特別是受到有控制權的股東、母公司、董事和管理人員的侵害,而公司怠於行使訴權時,符合法定條件的股東以自己的名義為公司的利益對侵害人提起訴訟,追究其法律責任的訴訟制度。Lastly, the paper proposes five suggestions to restrict controlling shareholders to enlist self - interests from tunneling of cash dividend and to protect rights and interests of small and medium shareholders
本文最後給出五點建議,試圖限制控股股東通過現金股利的「隧道效應」謀取私利,以保護中小股東的正當權益。Observing with a global view, the agency conflict intrigued by the insider control is not the traditional anglo - saxon corporate combat between the managers and dispersed investors but the conflict between the controlling blockholders and middle or small investors, so the focus is transferred from the conflict between the managers and dispersed investors to the tradeoff between the controlling blockholders and middle or small investors
所以,從全球范圍看,內部人控制所引發的代理沖突不是英美傳統意義上公司經理和分散投資者間的利益相爭,而是控股股東和中小投資者之間的代理沖突。矛盾的焦點自然就從經理層和分散投資者的沖突轉化為大股東與中小投資者間的權衡取捨問題。In china, the capital market was cut up in to un - circulate and circulate field, and the listed company has high concentrated ownership structure. the core agent problem of the chinese listed company is conflict between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder. the core agent problem provides the new angle of view to our research in cash dividend policy
但由於中國市場被人為分割為非流通股與流通股市場,且上市公司股權結構高度集中,中國上市公司代理問題的重心轉向控股股東與中小股東之間的利益沖突,這對研究我國上市公司現金股利政策提供了新的視角。Whereas, majority shareholders may misuse their controlling position to squeeze out minority shareholders in lack of effective mechanism of supervision and balance
然而在缺乏有效的監督和制衡機制的情況下,多數股東往往濫用控制地位,侵害小股東利益。It is quite common that major shareholders use their control position against the interests of listed companies, and ultimately against the interest of shareholders
大股東利用自己的控制地位,侵害上市公司利益,並最終侵害其他中小股東利益的現象相當普遍。This paper mainly concerns about controlling shareholder ’ s fiduciary duty which consists of four parts : survey on controlling shareholder ’ s fiduciary duty, civil law foundation of controlling shareholders ’ fiduciary duty ’ s generation, performance of controlling shareholder ’ s violation of fiduciary duty and judging standards, precautions and almsgiving measure of controlling shareholder ’ s violation of fiduciary duty
控制股東侵害公司和少數股東利益,違反誠信義務的行為有多種表現方式,如虛假出資、操縱市場價格、操縱利潤分配、惡意出讓控制股等。為維護公司和少數股東的合法權益,應對控制股東違反誠信義務的防範和救濟措施兩方面作出規定。However, our listed companies of state - owned exist the serious insider control problem, for example making use of the job power to take the gray income, incumbency to consume to inflate etc. these activities violated the shareholder rights seriously, affecting the company oneself contain the preface movement, breaking the investment environment of china, also resulting the healthy development of stock market in endanger
然而,我國國有控股上市公司內卻存在著嚴重的內部人控制問題,如利用職權牟取灰色收入、在職消費膨脹等。這些活動嚴重侵害了股東權益,影響了公司自身的有序運行,破壞了中國的投資環境,也給證券市場健康發展造成危害。Under the mode of financial holding company ( fhc ), there would happen : the holding company abuses its controlling power over its subsidiary companies, ignores their autonomy and damages the interests of creditors and the public
但在金融控股公司模式下,也不可避免的存在著控股公司濫用對子公司的控制權,無視子公司的獨立地位,損害債權人和社會公共利益的行為。Ensures that the group has appropriate risk management, internal control and regulatory compliance procedures in place and that it communicates adequately with shareholders and stakeholders
確保本集團具備適當的風險管理內部控制及監管程序,並與股東及利益相關人士保持充份溝通分享友人