統制股權 的英文怎麼說

中文拼音 [tǒngzhìgǔquán]
統制股權 英文
controlling interest
  • 統 : Ⅰ名詞1 （事物間連續的關系） interconnected system 2 （衣服等的筒狀部分） any tube shaped part of ...
  • 制 : Ⅰ動詞1 （製造） make; manufacture 2 （擬訂; 規定） draw up; establish 3 （用強力約束; 限定; 管束...
  • 股 : Ⅰ名詞1 （大腿） thigh; haunches 2 （機關、企業、團體中的組織單位） section of an office or enterp...
  • 權 : Ⅰ名詞1 [書面語] （秤錘） counterpoise; weight （of a steelyard）2 （權力） power; authority 3 （...
  • 股權 : stock right股權合營 equity joint venture; 股權價值 value of stock right
  1. The structure of market would be united and perfected, the steps of appearing in the market for anti - public ownership enterprises would be fastened, the stock - rights structure of company would be disunited. 2

    首先，完善市場結構，盡快實現統一，結束分割局面，具體從以下幾方面入手：加快非公有制企業上市的步伐，實現上市公司的股權結構多元化，加快中國股市統一的步伐。
  2. Government ' s monopoly of capital market also leaded to the " shell " value of listed company which is irrelative to the company ' s invest value, which made the higher general price in the market. in addition to, the structure of investors which is consisting of many individual investors and few institution investors lets it easy to manipulate the stock market for the institution investors. according to the origins of the systematic risk, it is necessary to improve the market mechanism and market efficiency to eliminate the system root of the risk to decrease the risks

    突出地表現在：資本市場服務于國企轉制，造成上市公司股權結構存在缺陷，致使公司治理失效，上市公司缺乏持續發展的能力，公司經營風險轉化為市場的系統性風險；政府對資本市場準入的行政性壟斷，形成上市公司「殼」價值，虛高股票市場價格，引發系統性風險；金融市場分割，特別是貨幣市場資金缺乏進入資本市場的正常渠道，利率市場化水平低，影響金融資產定價，導致違規融資盛行，加大了市場風險；而由於市場監管不到位，以散戶為主的投資主體結構，則易導致機構大戶利用內幕信息操縱股價，機構投資者的發展不僅沒有成為穩定市場的力量，反而成為操縱市場的主力，加劇了市場波動。
  3. Countermeasures for the serious problems of the financial control over subsidiary companies are to ( 1 ) establish a scientific share holding structure of its subsidiary companies ; ( 2 ) strengthen its control over authorization right of its subsidiary companies ; ( 3 ) establish a scientific budget duty system ; ( 4 ) establish a scientific financial reporting system ; ( 5 ) use modern technology of information and network to establish the financial balance network of business operation, accounting checking network and electronic bank system ; ( 6 ) perfect the target assessing system over its subsidiary companies ; ( 7 ) send financial supervisors to its subsidiary companies ; ( 8 ) strengthen the scheduled or nonscheduled financial audit over its subsidiary companies

    摘要子公司的財務控制問題日顯突出，解決的對策是：建立科學的子公司股權控制結構；加強對子公司進行授權控制；建立科學的責任預算制度；制定科學的財務報告制度；利用現代化的信息網路系統，建立經營業務結算網、會計核算網和網上銀行結算系統；完善對子公司的考核指標體系；向子公司委派財務總監來實現日常的財務監控;加強定期或不定期審計，實現對子公司的財務監督。
  4. This paper carries out study on corporate governance based on system theory, advances concept of corporate governance, analyzes and abstracts system core of corporate governance from the point of mechanism by means of study on environment energy - rank principle, running mechanism and model of corporate governance. this paper analyzes mechanism of stimulation and restraint by using game theory, verifies effect of stock right structure on efficiency of corporate governance in view of connection between capital and corporate governance, gives method of resolving optimum stock right limit of collection and deconcentration and adventure share model of blending capital, and discusses problem of entrance of stakeholders to corporate governance etc. at last, according to system theory of corporate governance studied, this paper analyzes governance system of chinese state - owned and its effective factors, and advances complete countermove idea of corporate governance system

    本論文以系統理論為基礎對公司治理結構進行了研究，提出了公司治理結構系統的概念，分析提煉出了公司治理結構系統核，並通過對公司治理結構系統環境、系統能級原理和系統運行機制與模式的研究，從機制的角度分析了公司治理結構系統運行模式；運用博弈論對公司治理過程中的激勵約束機制進行了分析；針對資本結構與公司治理結構的關系，運用模型驗證了股權結構對公司治理效率的影響，給出了求解最佳股權集散度的方法和融資風險分擔模型；探討了利益相關者介入公司治理結構的問題等等。
  5. Subsequent chapter 3 is directed at analyses of shareholder - led corporate governance in uk and usa, bank - led corporate governance in germany and japan. chapter 4 and chapter 5 are analyses of capital structure and governance model of soes and analyses of governance efficiency, and set forth suggestions of policy over deepening soes reform. it is worthwhile stated that we postulate an optimizing pathway for soes capital structure to achieve interim of soes governance model, as is " all stake - holders participating under shareholder - led corporate governance model "

    論文第四章與第五章為國有企業資本結構與企業治理效率研究，分析了傳統體制遺傳下來的國有企業的資本結構及其歷史成因；並由此引致的國有企業治理結構的低效率和缺陷，並提出了提高我國國有企業的治理效率的發展方向，分別探討了企業資本結構和公司治理的優化，最後構建適合我國國有企業發展的公司治理模式?股權主導下的利益相關者共同治理模式。
  6. Firstly, the paper retrospects the development of eso and tries to probe into the theoretical field : the explanation of it ' s definition, the conclusion of it ' s characters, the comparison of eso and other stock inspiration system, followed by the analysis of it ' s theoretical basis and incentive effect ; meanwhile, the paper probes into the realistic situations of eso in usa and china in order to seek the regulation and draw the advantages and disadvantages ; to this part, the paper takes the following four items as the main barriers to eso ' s implementation in china : the over restriction of current law system, the low efficiency of the market, the poor corporate governance structure and a lack of a reasonable performance index system, and elaborately analyze the impacts of the obstacles on eso ; after the analysis made above, the paper gets down to taking some methods to solve the problems in accordance with the characteristic of the barriers. as far as the internal defects of the mechanism are concerned, the paper begins with the scientifically design of the key components, studying the aspects of bestowal, change, loss, the executive method and the executive time. then the paper focuses on designing a performance index system which is an essential part of eso, introducing the bsc to improve the present performance index system, under the reasonable guidelines resigning it at both the levels of company ' s and employee ' s levels. finally, as regards how to perfect the outside surrounding of eso, the thesis makes some suggestion

    本文首先回顧了股票期權制在國內外的發展及較為詳盡的分析了股票期權制度的相關理論：闡述了其涵義，特徵，理論基礎，激勵效應並於其他幾個較易混淆的股權激勵機製作逐一的比較，以進一步澄清人們對其的錯誤認識；同時，對股票期權制在美國和我國的現狀進行深入的實證研究，探求其內在規律，在肯定其成果時指出其不足；至此，筆者認為，我國上市公司要推行股票期權制度將主要面臨以下四類障礙：公司治理結構不完善、市場有效性差、現行法規體系不完善及缺乏客觀的業績考評指標體系，並詳細分析了各類障礙的現狀及對股票期權制的負面影響；在此基礎上，針對各類障礙的不同性質，著手探討消除這些障礙的措施：對于股票期權制內部的缺陷，本文先對各個關鍵要素進行科學設計，系統的剖析了贈與、變更、喪失、執行方式、股票來源等技術性問題，再以大量篇幅研究了如何構建出一套與實施股票期權制相配套的業績考核指標體系，引進平衡計分卡的思想對國內現有的指標體系加以改進，以一組合理的評價原則為指導，從公司及員工個人業績考評兩個層面上來設計該指標體系。
  7. This paper makes an statistical analysis on the rate of every financing amount to overall capital source of chinese listed companies from year 1993 to 2000 and draws the characteristic of the financing order of chinese listed companies : the financing order is stock financing - bank loan - internal financing - bond financing from 1993 to 1997 soon after stock market was set up in china ; affected by various kinds of economic policies and other factors, the financing order is bank loan - stock financing - internal financing - bond financing after 19 98. the conclusion is reverse to the " pecking order theory " and that of the companies in developed countries, namely ignoring internal financing and having a partiality for stock financing, extremely with the disgust to debt financing

    本文通過對我國上市公司1993年至2000年資金來源總體情況和和各年各融資方式所佔比重的統計分析，得出我國上市公司融資順序的特徵：我國上市公司在股市建立不久的1993年至1997年其融資順序為股票融資?銀行貸款?內部積累?債券融資， 1998年以後受各種經濟政策和制度因素的影響其融資順序為銀行貸款?股票融資?內部積累?債券融資。說明我國上市公司在融資過程中表現出與西方經典「融資順序理論」 （ peckingordertheory ）以及發達國家上市公司融資順序相異的「融資偏好悖論」 ，即忽視內部融資，對股權融資極度偏好和對債務融資的厭惡。
  8. With the introduction of two variables ? “ shareholders ’ supervision, portfolio of salary and control rights ”, we construct a new tmt “ principle ? agent ” optimizing model ; moreover, basing on mathematical analysis of company performance mechanism, a linear model of corporate performance and tmt incentive portfolio is built ; and also, variables of incentives and control rights are introduced to help parsing tmt incentive problems in the view of the shareholders ’ supervision and we succeed in separating the contribution of tmt ’ s ability to corporate performance from their endeavor. so we propose three ways to inspirit tmt ? annual salary design based on implicit value, performance - based bonus and stock ownership, and non - material incentive portfolio mode as well, which can overcome shortcomings of traditional single explicit material incentives system

    引入公司股東監督變量、薪酬與控制權激勵組合變量構建新型的高級管理層激勵組合委託-代理優化模型;結合公司績效產生機理的數學分析，構建了公司績效線性模型與高級管理層線性激勵組合模型;引入股票期權激勵與公司控制權激勵變量，解析基於股東監督的高級管理層激勵問題，成功實現了公司高級管理層能力變量與努力變量對公司績效貢獻的分離解釋;提出了基於隱性價值的年薪設計、基於績效的獎金與股權設計、基於隱性需求的非物質性激勵組合模式，克服了傳統的單一的物質性顯性激勵的局限性。
  9. The separate phenomenon of the rights of ownership and management has taken place, and the control of joint - stock company has converted from the shareholders to the managing organ

    於是，所有權與經營權分離就成為邏輯的歸結。股份公司也由傳統的股東控制，轉變為由經營者控制，與此同時，所有者已經不足以監督日益膨脹的經營機關。
  10. Besides, there are great deals of other questions, which cause various kinds of mechanism of corporate governance unable to play a effective role. at the same time, the article make a deeply analysis to the reasons. finally, the article put forward some advises : reducing the state - owned stock progressively, foster the institutional investor actively, design some encouragement and restriction mechanism to a manager, reform and perfect the state assets management system, perfect regulation system and withdraw mechanism of security market and unifying the stock market progressively, set up powerful security payment mechanism of debts, strengthen restriction of creditor ' s rights of the banks, develop corporate bond financing, and so on

    本文以資本結構的基本理論為起點，對各種資本結構理論觀點進行概括，並從股權和債權兩方面分析了資本結構對公司治理的作用和影響效果；通過對國有上市公司的資本結構進行實證分析，揭示了我國國有上市公司的資本結構存在股權和債權結構不合理，股權內部構成和債權內部構成不合理等諸多問題，由此導致了公司治理各種機制的有效作用無法正常發揮，使得公司治理的效應不佳，並進一步對產生這種股權和債權治理效率低下的成因進行了深層次的分析；最後從宏觀和微觀層次，提出對國有股進行有步驟的減持並逐步實現其流通、改革與完善國有資產管理體制、積極培育機構投資者、完善證券市場的法規體系和逐步統一股票市場、建立強有力的償債保障機制、設計經理人激勵約束機制、強化銀行的債權約束、發展企業債券融資等政策建議。
  11. Part 4 proposes the property rights as the breach of chinese bank system reform should take the thorough separation of the ultimate property rights and the legal personal property rights as the prerequisite and take the joint stock system as the ultimate form. due to the strains in chinese bank reform, the author views that, on the basis of the reports at the 16th national peoples " congress, the joint stock system reform with flexibility, emphasis and division ought to be conducted and state - owned capital ought to fade out of the domain of competitive commercial bank

    對于股份制改革的具體路徑，本文指出，鑒於我國迄今銀行改革的困境，應以十六大報告為指導方針，以靈活的形式，分階段、有重點地對銀行系統進行股份制改革，促進股權的多元化、分散化和社會化，在銀行業重組中以非公有製成分的發展激活體制內產權變革，除政策性金融領域外，國有資本漸次從竟爭性的商業銀行領域淡出。
  12. The difference is that domestic mbo is the result of institutional transition, but the overseas mbo is the competitive choice, and in china the price difference in share transactions makes managers have the goal to acquire the profits. this article analyzes the game relationship of mbo in china, and proves that the root caucus of china mbo non - prohibiting for the different behalves between local government and national assets management department, and between the representatives of state stockholders and managers. this paper makes an empirical analysis of the mbo performance of 26 listed companies in china and proves that mbo are beneficial to improve company ’ s performance, and further we analyze the problems, which exist in china mbo, and gives some suggestions, we think that the rational action to mbo is to give proper guides, instead of prohibiting it simply

    本文應用委託代理理論、人力資本理論和產權理論等對中西mbo動因進行系統的比較分析，得出結論認為中外mbo具有相同的激勵動因，都是知識經濟時代智能資本獲取企業所有權的企業權力安排形式，不同的是國內mbo是制度轉型的結果，而國外mbo是競爭選擇的結果，同時由於我國mbo存在股權交易價差，管理層具有獲取價差的直接動機;本文運用博弈論的方法對我國mbo 「禁而不止」問題進行分析，分析結論認為國資監管部門與地方政府和國有股東代表與管理層之間的利益差異是導致當前我國mbo 「禁而不止」的根本原因;文章通過對我國26家上市公司mbo並購績效的實證分析，得出結論認為mbo有利於公司績效的改善，進而文章對當前我國mbo存在問題展開分析，並提出幾點建議，我們認為當前對我國mbo的理性做法是適當引導，而非簡單禁止。
  13. Carrying out effectively the option incentive system proposed can combine closely the interests of both management and stockholders of a list company to integrate operation objectives and realize completely the equity - proxy system in the corporate restructuring process

    摘要股權激勵制度的有效實施可以將經營者的利益和股東的利益緊密結合在一起，真正統一公司的經營目標，從根本上解決公司治理過程中的委託代理問題。
  14. According to recent researches, we find out that even in america, large shareholders and institutional investors are important in corporate governance. and we argue that the corporate shares can be large shareholders and perform good supervision in corporate governance. in order to illustrate our opinion, we have collected 52 cases concerning transferring state - owned shares to corporate shares

    本文中，我們將1998年發生的52起國家股股權變動的案例進行分類統計分析，表明國家股向法人股轉讓的樣本中，公司治理結構中的大股東再造、董事會的重構、對代理人的約束與激勵以及內部人的控制，都有程度不同的改進。
  15. Adopting the analyses including comparative law, positive law, positive jurisprudence, social jurisprudence, economics jurisprudence and the related theories of statistic, institution economics, economics and law, this paper introduces and evaluates the foreign and the domestic relative legislations of manipulation. the concept of manipulation is clearly defined and divided into three types according to the object behavior. this paper deals with the civil liabilities of manipulation from the ways of material law and procedural law

    本文試圖以一個新的視角，運用比較分析、實證分析、法社會學分析、法經濟學分析方法，藉助統計學、制度經濟學、經濟學和法學的相關理論，對其概念進行了界定，分析了國內外操縱市場行為的特點和立法的利弊，並結合我國「股權分置」改革和「全流通」的背景，從實體法和程序法兩個層面對操縱市場的民事責任的相關制度進行了探索。
  16. The " separation system ", which came into being after the " glass - steagall act ", represents the separation of commercial banking, investment banking and insurance services. the " combination system ", which is just the opposite concept, has two meanings. one relates to the combination of financial services in the same legal person, while the other relates to the combination of shareholding rights of several subsidiaries providing difference services

    與「分業」相對應的"混業"有兩層意義：第一層含義是金融業務的混合、交叉經營，即業務的混業，典型的代表是德國的全能銀行制； "混業"的第二層含義是金融控股權的混業，即在金融控股公司里有多個法人子公司，它們統一被控制在一個母公司之下，但彼此之間實行"分業經營，分業管理" 。
  17. But, the dynamic stock ownership system also has some weakness. we may discover that, the certain aspects in dynamic stock ownership system execution such as the essential person selects, post stock specified amount determination and the contribution stock assignment, also has very big subjectivity. it was still continuing the very complicated relation with the traditional system

    我們可以發現，在動態股權制執行中的某些方面（如關鍵人的選聘、崗位股額度的確定、貢獻股的分配）還帶有較大的主觀性，其與傳統體制仍延續著千絲萬縷的聯系，稍不注意，必然影響到動態股權制的激勵效果。
  18. The split of shares is an outcome of china ’ s economy system transformation. constrained by the traditional theories and ideas, it has a profound historical background and inevitability

    股權分置是我國經濟體制轉軌過程中的產物，受到傳統理論與思想的束縛，有著深刻的歷史背景和必然性。
  19. According to system theory, these two issues have coordinated requirements, and therefore can produce coordinated effects, which provide rational basis for parallel construction of them. because of the practical feasibility, parallel construction of the two is an effective means to improve the basic defects of state - owned enterprise ownership institution and perfect the management of state - owned enterprises

    根據系統論的觀點，國有股減持與經營者股權激勵機制的構建具有協同性要求，可以產生協同效應，從而為二者并行提供了合理性依據；而且基於經營者股權激勵的國有股減持方式具有較強的現實可行性，是改進國有企業產權制度基本缺陷、完善企業治理結構的有效方式。
  20. The third part indicates that in the course of parallel construction of reduction of state - owned stocks and stock right incentive for state - owned enterprise managers, there are many difficulties and obstacles in problem identification and policy implementation, which affect the smooth construction of the two and its efficiency and therefore need serious consideration

    第三部分指出在具體推進國有股減持與經營者股權激勵機制構建并行的過程中，還存在認識和操作方面的各種困難與障礙，包括一些觀點需要澄清和統一，相關法規亟待制定和實施，企業內外部配套制度尚需建立和完善等等。
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