corporate ownership rights 中文意思是什麼
corporate ownership rights
解釋
法人所有權-
The expropriation influences the choice of financing pattern, leads to high concentration of ownership, impairs rights and interests of small shareholders and affects the efficiency of corporate governance, thus dwindles the value of corporation
掠奪行為影響了公司對融資模式的選擇，促使股權高度集中，損害了小股東利益，影響到公司治理的有效性，進而造成公司價值降低。 -
Corporate governance exists in the company in every kind. shareholder structure in chinese stock market originates from non - liqudity of rights of control, this is passive give - up or compulsory give - up, it was system selection under public ownership in that time. along with deepening of economic reform and pluralization of sharehold structure, as a special commodity, rights of control bring about the need of liqudity, this is internal reson of circulating system, is also
公司治理就以各種形式存在於企業之中。中國證券市場上股權分置起源於控制權的非流動性，這是被動放棄或強制放棄，是當時在公有制條件下的制度選擇。隨著經濟改革的深化和股權結構的多元化，控制權作為一種特殊商品日益產生了流動性需求，這是全流通制度的內在動因，也是現代商品經濟的合理訴求。 -
Secondly, ownership control is an important way to restrain the act of plundering conducted by large shareholders while protecting the rights of minority shareholders. thirdly, compared to the inefficiency of state - owned shares and negotiable shares, the percentage of shares held by artificial persons is positively related with corporate performance. fourthly, interior shareholding has little stimulant effect on executive of corporate
目前中國上市公司的股權結構具有以下特徵： （ 1 ）股權高度集中， 「一股獨大」現象嚴重； （ 2 ）股份按照投資主體被劃分為國家股、法人股、社會公眾股，其中占總股本約2 3的國家股和法人股不可流通； （ 3 ）內部人即公司高級管理人員持股數量少、持股比例低； （ 4 ）機構投資者規模尚小，總體持股比例較低。 -
Then the second chapter analyzes the mbo ’ s economics base : berle - means hypotheses 、 managerial revolution 、 agency cost 、 ownership cost 、 corporate governance 、 three - needs theory ( need for achievement 、 need for power 、 need for affiliation ) 、 property rights encourage, and then points out that the mbo system reduces monitoring cost and collectivity decision - making cost for manage level utmost by means of combined the role manager with owner, which also inspires manage level to make great efforts on management
第二章解析了管理層收購的經濟學基礎:伯勒?米斯假說和經理革命理論、代理成本理論、所有權成本及人力資本補償理論、公司治理結構理論、激勵機制理論和產權激勵理論，指出管理層收購制度通過使所在者和管理者身份合一，最大限度地降低管理人員監控成本和集體決策成本。 -
With the introduction of two variables ? “ shareholders ’ supervision, portfolio of salary and control rights ”, we construct a new tmt “ principle ? agent ” optimizing model ; moreover, basing on mathematical analysis of company performance mechanism, a linear model of corporate performance and tmt incentive portfolio is built ; and also, variables of incentives and control rights are introduced to help parsing tmt incentive problems in the view of the shareholders ’ supervision and we succeed in separating the contribution of tmt ’ s ability to corporate performance from their endeavor. so we propose three ways to inspirit tmt ? annual salary design based on implicit value, performance - based bonus and stock ownership, and non - material incentive portfolio mode as well, which can overcome shortcomings of traditional single explicit material incentives system
引入公司股東監督變量、薪酬與控制權激勵組合變量構建新型的高級管理層激勵組合委託-代理優化模型;結合公司績效產生機理的數學分析，構建了公司績效線性模型與高級管理層線性激勵組合模型;引入股票期權激勵與公司控制權激勵變量，解析基於股東監督的高級管理層激勵問題，成功實現了公司高級管理層能力變量與努力變量對公司績效貢獻的分離解釋;提出了基於隱性價值的年薪設計、基於績效的獎金與股權設計、基於隱性需求的非物質性激勵組合模式，克服了傳統的單一的物質性顯性激勵的局限性。 -
Llsv ( 1999 ) made demonstration research on 27 developed market economy countries " ownership structure and found out the complete separation of proprietorship and control rights was simply a conception and apotheosis even in the largest corporate
Llsv （ 1999 ）對27個成熟市場經濟國家的所有權結構進行了實證研究，他們發現即使是在規模最大的企業中，完全的兩權分離只是一個概念和神化。 -
( 2 ) the representatives of state ownership should exercise their rights within the framework of corporate governance mechanism, and focus on the index of firm performance when they evaluate their appointment. ( 3 ) when establishing a company, we should avoid forming a superficially diversified ownership structure. ( 4 ) through introducing the independent directors and representatives of the institution investors, who have the governance ability, to the board, we will be able to improve the performance of listed companies
在此基礎上，作者認為：不能人為地規定上市公司的股權集中度；國有股權的代表應在公司治理機制的框架內行使權利，在評價任免經理時應注重業績指標；在股份公司（尤其是國有控股公司）設立時，建議引入實質意義上的多元化股東，避免以行政手段促成表面上的多元化的股權結構；目前，通過引入獨立董事、引進有治理能力的機構投資者等手段，可以改進上市公司的治理。 -
The separation of ownership and control rights result in the incentive of tmt and become the core question in corporate governance
公司所有權與控制權分離使得對高級管理層的激勵成為公司治理的核心問題。 -
With separation of ownership and management, corporate managers are in the front line of business and management. their power tend to expand and to be abused. this is so - called " managerial revolution ". because of the limitations of the capital market and managers " market, to define corporate managers " legal status and to dispose their rights, duties and obligations accordingly are necessitated
在公司所有權和經營權相分離，存在代理成本的情況下，公司經理處在經營管理的前沿，掌握著大量經營資源，經理權有擴張之勢，濫用之虞，在經理人市場以及資本市場的約束力有限的情況下，對公司經理的法律地位的探討以促進相應的立法完善尤其重要。 -
Jensen and meckling ( 1976 ) combined the various factors of the agency theory, property rights theory and financial theory to a kind of corporate ownership structure theory and intrigued the upsurge of the corporate governance study
詹森和麥克林（ 1976 ）將代理理論、產權理論和金融理論的各種要素結合起來，發展了一種有關企業所有權結構的理論，由此引發了公司治理研究的學術熱潮。
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