profit incentive 中文意思是什麼
profit incentive
解釋
利潤誘因-
This article contains three parts, five chapters. the first part introduces the incentive models of actual bonus stock synoptically, analyses the stock on hand, option shares and stock option, the three kind of important incentive models, on rights and incumbencies, value and the incentive guidance by contrast. the second part discusses the difficulties and influential factors in the design of technical bonus stock, quests for the incentive models of technical bonus stock, analyses superiority and inferior position in action, difference and interosculation between them, discusses the need and significance for the technical bonus stock reanimation in the middle - small technicalfilms. in order to make use of the technical bonus stock distribution mechanism fully, inspire the talent of technologists, encourage their devotion to films, we have some important discussion on the technical bonus stock distribution policy, introduce the distributed models of technical bonus stock, point out the questions in the excutive course, and offer the solution correspondingly. in the third part, we discuss the technical stock option design on middle - small technical films, and consider the logical thoughtfulness in the course of reanimation as follows : the more outstanding achievement for the powered man the more increase on special target the lower price on technical option premium the more profit the more effective reanimation. in the parameter, a set of detailed program is designed, which includes establishment of incentive fund, institution of merit system for the plan ' s grantors, award of stock option, determination of premium, so as to reduce random in the incentive course, have a great effect on the mormative management for the
本文內容共分為五章三大部分，第一部分概括性地介紹了現行股權激勵方式，對現股、期股和期權這三種重要的激勵方式，從權利義務、價值和激勵導向三個方面進行了對比分析；第二部分探討了技術股權設計的難點和影響因素，討論了我國中小科技企業技術股權激勵的方式，分析它們在激勵中的優勢和不足，以及它們之間的區別與聯系，並對中小科技企業實施技術股權激勵的必要性和意義進行了探討。在文中還重點討論了中小科技企業技術股權分配的策略，介紹了技術股權紅利分配方式，指出在技術股權激勵過程中應注意的問題，並提出相應的解決辦法，目的在於充分利用技術股權分配機制，來激發技術人員潛在的創新能力，激勵他們為企業作貢獻；第三部分著重探討了中小科技企業技術股份期權的方案設計，在激勵方面，按照技術期權獲受人的業績越突出特定的指標增長越快行權價越低獲利越多激勵效果越好的邏輯思路進行考慮；在參數設計方面，對技術期權計劃中激勵基金、授予和考核、行權價格等參數進行了詳細地分析設計，旨在減少技術期權激勵過程中的隨意性，為中小科技企業的規范化管理起到一定的指導和借鑒作用。 -
Concretely, it is creditor ' s right from the angle of request of company ' s performing obligation ; it is expectant right from the realization of right ; it is option from the content of exercising right. simultaneously, eso has the characters of right, profitability, time limit and nonnegotiable. eso system is not an arrange for system of property right but a long term incentive mechanism, because the aim of enterprise executive is not property of enterprise but rich profit by exercising their right, that is the value of eso for senior manager is not to control company but to acquire profit from the price difference
第一部分分析了股票期權和股票期權制度的含義，指出股票期權的性質從不同角度分析可以認定為債權、期待權、選擇權，具體而言，從需權利人請求公司履行義務的角度它是一種債權，從權利實現的角度它是一種期待權，從權利行使內容的角度它是一種選擇權，同時它具有權利性、收益性、時限性、非流通性等特點；股票期權制度是一種長期激勵制度而非產權制度安排，因為企業經營者的目標是通過行使權利獲得豐厚收益，而非企業的所有權，即該制度對高級管理人員的最大價值是獲得差價利潤而不是控制公司。 -
Then the dissertation demonstrated the logic precondition that entrepreneurial human capital participate in corporation earnings, discusses the questions of price - making of entrepreneurial human capital, and explored the development of executive compensation system in china, furthermore constructed the corporation profit distribution models that take entrepreneurial s human capital as an important distribution factor with the long - run compensation incentive as the core model
本文論證了企業家人力資本參與企業收益分配的邏輯前提，討論了企業家人力資本的定價問題，並在對我國企業家收入分配現狀和改革措施進行分析的基礎上，深入探討了中國企業家收入分配製度，進而構建了以長期激勵為主的中國企業家人力資本分享企業收益的模型。 -
The results show that : ( l ) adoption of the intermittent mean price instead of the point price at the end of the option will help to reduce the chances of profit - making manipulated by managers and to curb the manager ' s motive to control the stock price ; ( 2 ) generally speaking, stock price of mean price option is more incentive to the managers than that of the black - scholes ; ( 3 ) when the stock market slumps at the end of the option, mean price option will ensure a moderate insurance for the managers ; ( 4 ) when stock price slumps alone with the overall situation of the stock market in the intermittent option, mean price option. however, will be inefficient as an incentive. chapter four addresses the questions concerning the manager ' s manipulation of the stock price, and the increase of the option risks because of long - term slump of the stock market
第三部分包括第三至五章，第三章針對時點價格容易被控制和時點價格的波動性太大，增加了經理期權的風險等問題，研究採用期權期內的平均價格替代期權期末的時點價格計算經理股票期權收益，構建了幾何型平均價格期權定價公式，並與black ? scholes期權定價公式進行了定量對比分析，結果表明： （ 1 ）採用期權期內平均價格替代期權期末時點價格有利於降低經理通過操縱股價的牟利機會，遏制經理操縱股價的動機； （ 2 ）一般條件下，平均價格期權股票價格對經理的激勵作用優于標準期權； （ 3 ）當臨近期權期末股價下跌時，平均價格期權能為經理提供適度保險； （ 4 ）當期權期內，股票受大市持續走弱影響而下跌時，平均價格期權失去了激勵作用。 -
It mainly shows as the following : 1. the number of tobacco enterprises is too much ; 2. the level of technology is low ; 3. the level of management and profit is low ; 4. the products have no individuality ; 5. the profit of enterprises diversity are small ; 6. the enterprise lack incentive system ; 7. the products have no international competitive force
在巨大的市場機會和日趨激烈的市場競爭中，國內煙草企業在不斷發展壯大的同時也存在許多問題，主要表現在以下幾個方面： 1 、生產企業過多但規模小； 2 、企業技術水平低； 3 、企業管理水平和經濟效益低下； 4 、產品個性化不突出； 5 、企業多元化效益低下； 6 、企業人才隊伍缺乏激勵機制。 -
To guarantee incentive performance, legend paid much attention to profit return and constituted incentive power and reasonable assess criterions. negative incentive measures are adopted either timely
為了保證渠道激勵效果，聯想在激勵渠道過程中還特別注意對返利的使用、建立合理的激勵力和考核標準，並適當採用負激勵。 -
For one thing, critics point out, the market has little incentive to produce goods and services that generate little profit, which include just about everything consumed by poor people
一方面，批評指出，市場對生產薄利的商品或勞務不多做鼓勵，其中就包括了窮人有能力負擔的消費。 -
And then the author builds up some ways of how to evaluate the value of intellectual capital, on this basis the author designs incentive mechanisms of intellectual capital participating in distributing plans of enterprise profit. these provides practical evidences of theory for enterprises of our country exploiting and managing intellectual capital and developing fully the use of intellectual capital for growing up of economy and increasing in value of enterprises
本文運用近年來國內外發展起來的智力資本有關理論對我國企業智力資本問題進行了分析和探討，提出了智力資本價值度量的方法，並在此基礎上提出了智力資本按價值參與企業收益分配方案的激勵機制，為我國企業開發和管理智力資本、充分發揮智力資本在經濟增長和企業增值中的作用提供了實踐上的理論依據。 -
These conclusions imply that enterprise management should develop customized software into industry - standard applications finally ; should pay attention to clients of good business environment and allocate more resources to non - government clients ; should design effective incentive mechanisms to shorten the limit time and increase the profit for projects in making strategic decisions
這些結論說明軟體企業在制定戰略時，需以定製產品和定製服務為起點，但最終必須研發成為具有行業特點的標準化應用軟體；在資源分配時，應重點關注地域商務環境好的客戶，適當提高非政府機構行業客戶的資源分配比例；應健全項目經理激勵制度，促使項目提前完工，從而降低開發成本，增加項目業績。 -
According to the incentive theories, this paper inquires into the current conditions of the incentive policy of high - tech enterprise in china, explains that the objects involved in the incentive policy include the departments and the key human resources, put forward that the sales department and the department of research and development should be given the profit - sharing plan, other departments, the revenue - sharing plan, and the key human resources, the two long - term incentive policy - stock options and phantom stocks
吸引並留住優秀人才的關鍵是建立有效的激勵機制。借鑒有關激勵理論，本文指出高新技術企業的內部激勵對象有兩類，一是企業內部各個部門，二是企業的中高層管理人員和技術人員等核心人力資源。針對我國高新技術企業內部激勵機制現狀，本文提出應對企業內各部門實行集體激勵機制，對中高層管理人員和技術人員實行長期激勵機制。 -
Stock option incentive system makes it possible that the operators enjoy the remains of the enterprise. this system makes the income of human capital becomes the function of the enterprise ' s profit. so, the utility function of principal and agent
股票期權制度使高新技術企業人力資本享有企業的剩餘索取權成為可能，它使人力資本的收益成為企業利潤的函數，從而也使雙方的效用函數盡可能地趨於一致，從而有效降低代理成本，這種長期激勵制度也將使人力資本努力工作，並達到雙贏的均衡狀態。 -
In this article, we will compare different banking institutions, study an extensive literature on relationship lending, then explain the theory in the frame of neo - institutional economics systematically and with modeling demonstration. after specifying the costs, benefits and net - profit transfers, we will analyze the banks and firms " characteristics and surrounding factors subject to the participation and incentive constrains, finally draw our conclusion that : lending behaviors between banks and firms are diverse and always affected by the two parts " bargaining power, social environment or their cognition to the relation. we comment that smes and banks develop relationship lending which is prone to satisfy the participation and incentive constrains, and that relationship lending should be a feasible way of smes " financing
本文將通過對各國銀企關系制度進行比較，就關系貸款命題對文獻進行廣泛調研，在新制度經濟學的分析框架下進行系統規范的理論闡述和模型證明，列舉關系貸款的預期收益、成本內容，對凈剩餘的租金轉移進行分析，在此基礎上研究使關系貸款滿足參與約束與激勵相容約束的銀行和企業特徵、制度環境因素，得出結論：各國市場環境下，銀行與企業之間的關系型融資有不同的表現形式，信貸行為受到銀企雙方談判地位、主觀認識的影響以及社會信用、經濟條件、制度背景等客觀環境的制約；中小企業和中小銀行之間的關系貸款安排易於滿足合約雙方的參與約束和激勵相容約束，不失為中小企業融資的一條可行途徑。 -
The mature foreign market experience shows that, when the competition in insurance market is complete, and the underwriting profit is slight, the incentive for further development comes from the profit acquired from insurance funds use
國外成熟保險市場經驗顯示，當保險市場競爭較為充分之後，承保業務利潤已經非常微薄，保險業進一步發展的動力來自於保險資金運用所獲得的利潤。 -
Meanwhile, if the new technology can reduce the cost sharply, the social welfare when two firms adopt the new technology may be lower than that when only one firm adopts it. this means that stronger incentive regulation and asymmetric regulation induce “ too many innovation ”. on the other hand, if the innovation is expensive and risky, and imitation is easy, the stronger incentive regulation and asymmetric regulation may increase the imitation profits of inefficient firm, so that it would adopt the waiting - imitation strategy, and this would reduce the aggressive innovation profit of efficient firm and prevent either firm from innovating
此時，若新技術能夠大幅降低生產成本，則兩個廠商都採用新技術時的社會福利可能會低於單個廠商採用新技術時的社會福利，即強激勵性規制政策和不對稱規制政策會引發「技術創新過度」 ;反之，當創新成本很高，且風險較大，模仿又比較容易時，強激勵性規制政策和不對稱規制政策可能會增加低效率廠商的模仿收益，從而使其嚴格採取等待-模仿策略，這會減少高效率廠商的進攻性創新收益，從而削弱它的創新動力，並最終阻礙自然壟斷產業的技術進步，此時，強激勵性規制政策和不對稱規制政策導致了「技術創新不足」 。 -
On the contrary, chicago school holds that predatory strategies are irrational and rare, not in concert with the long - term goal of profit - maximizing for a firm. therefore, the dominant firm has no incentive to monopoly
比較而言，后芝加哥學派所堅持的不完全信息假定更符合經濟行為的實際狀況，能夠更能令人信服地解釋所涉企業的動機或行為。 -
Consistent with the research in chapters, the strengthening of cti is studied from both the self - incentive and other - incentive perspective. it is demonstrated that the team members enjoy a limited level of self - incentive motivity and the effect of this self - incentive mode is state - contingent. a plan of profit sharing model between human capital and physical capital in innovative teams is given, and the five cardinal rules necessary to the evaluation of the value of human capital is provided too
第四章在第三章的基礎上，分別從自激勵和他激勵兩個角度研究了基於內部積累的企業技術創新能力的強化，論證了團隊成員自激勵的有限性和自激勵效果的狀態依存性，提出基於團隊人力資本和物質資本的二維利益分割方案和對團隊成員人力資本價值評估的五個標準。 -
Everybody had an incentive to do a deal, almost regardless of the homebuyers ' ability to repay ; the buyer hoping for a quick profit, the real - estate agent and mortgage broker hoping for a fee
人人都只想著做成交易而不顧購房者是否有能力還錢；購房者期望即得利益，房地產商和債權經紀人期望得到錢。
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