剩餘權益理論 的英文怎麼說
中文拼音 [shèngyúquányìlǐlún]
剩餘權益理論
英文
residual equity theory- 剩 : Ⅰ動詞(剩餘) be left over; remain Ⅱ形容詞(剩餘的) surplus; remnant
- 餘 : Ⅰ同「余」Ⅰ-Ⅳ1. Ⅱ名詞(姓氏) a surname
- 權 : Ⅰ名詞1 [書面語] (秤錘) counterpoise; weight (of a steelyard)2 (權力) power; authority 3 (...
- 益 : Ⅰ名詞1 (好處) benefit; profit; advantage 2 (姓氏) a surname Ⅱ形容詞(有益的) beneficialⅢ動詞...
- 理 : Ⅰ名詞1 (物質組織的條紋) texture; grain (in wood skin etc ) 2 (道理;事理) reason; logic; tru...
- 論 : 論名詞(記錄孔子及其門徒的言行的「論語」) the analects of confucius
- 剩餘 : overplus
- 權益 : rights and interests; legal right; inviolable rights
- 理論 : theory
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The behave and harm of insider control in state enterprise is discussed. the reason of insider control is analysed, me chain of consign and the lack of proprietor the unmatching of residual control and proceeds ; the deficiency of inspiring with manager ; the disfigurement of supervision and restriction etc are the reasons of insider control. the advice of controlling insider control is discussed from the angle of game theory, and think that big shareholders of enterprise have more power to supervise operator. in order to settle the question of insider control, the bestiring and inhibiting of manager should be consolidated. the superiority of employees in enterprise is emphasized in controlling insider control. the paper puts forward a new model to measure intrinsic value of human capital of manager, the compenhensive valuation metrix to decide the efficenncy of management and performance adjustment of human capital of manager
這是本文研究的意義所在。本文論述了我國國有企業內部人控制問題的表現和危害,比較了我國國有企業與國外企業的內部人控制問題的差異及特點。在分析委託代理鏈冗長及所有者缺位、經營者剩餘控制權和剩餘收益權不匹配、對公司經理人員的激勵嚴重不足、監督約束機制不健全等是形成國有企業內部人控制的主要原因的基礎上,從博弈論的角度探討控制內部人控制問題的政策建議,認為股權集中的大股東有更強的動力去監督目標公司,解決內部人控制問題在於強化對經理人員的約束、激勵。From the second to the fifth chapter such problems concerning state - owned property right are illustrated respectively as its definition, valuation and price fixing and capital sources of undertaking party and the disposal and use of transfer income. problems are raised with regard to the process of current property right system diversity in state - owned enterprises, such as the disagreement to the definition of state - owned property right, no standard of evaluation, imperfection of price fixing system and relative confusion of transfer income disposal and use. what ' s more, new solutions are offered : the probe into state - owned property right definition " changsha model " is confirmed positively ; two specific ways of quantification - - " the method of average growth rate of state - owned property right " and " the method of average cost of labor in market " ; the concept " present value of earnings " is applied to the property evaluation of receivable accounts, finished goods, invisible assets and so on ; the unjust in price fixing of state - owned property right can be avoided by improving property valuation methods, perfecting capital market especially property right trading market and bettering information publishing system ; as to the guarantee problem of human resources financial contribution, an original key is offered
第一章運用產權理論對國企產權多元化改革進行經濟學分析;第二章至第五章主要圍繞國有產權的界定問題、評估問題、定價問題、承接方的資金來源問題、轉讓收入的處置運用問題分別進行闡述,指出了當前國企產權多元化過程中存在著國有產權界定不統一、評估不規范、定價機制不完善、處置運用相對混亂等諸多問題,並提出新的解決思路:肯定國有產權界定「長沙模式」的積極探索意義,提出量化職工創造剩餘價值的「國有資產平均增長率法」和「平均市場勞動成本法」 ;將「收益現值」概念運用到對應收賬款、產成品、無形資產等資產評估之中;應從完善資產評估方法、完善資本市場特別是產權交易市場和健全信息公開機制三個方面來解決國有產權定價不公問題;就人力資本出資的擔保問題提出實際債務承擔額(比例)應小於名義出資額(比例)的新思路,並認為人力資本市場上的交易價格應包括絕對出資額和相對出資額兩部分。Based on economic theory on team production, getting - surplus right concentrating on supervisor will benefit whole team
根據經典經濟理論對團隊生產的分析,剩餘索取權集中於監督者一方有利於團隊的整體利益。Esop is based on the theory that human capital and matter capital create surplus value together. and it is also the demand of common governance pattern that stakeholders equally participate in management, decision - making and surplus rights distribution
國有企業員工持股制度是建立在人力資本與物質資本共同創造企業剩餘價值的立論基礎上的,它同時也是利益相關者平等參與企業經營決策和剩餘權分配的共同治理模式之必然要求。Therefore, it is very necessary to study the financial management as a manager in enterprise. the first part discusses the situation of financing and the reason for the difficult of financing ; the second part analyzes the financial theories and the factors of financing : he adaptability of the ability of enterprises, the control of asymmetric information and the trade - off between risk and revenue ; the third part discusses financial management which has to answer ten questions : what is the need to finance
第一部分,中小企業融資現狀及融資難的原因,認為中小企業融資難來自於企業內部、剩餘資金所有者、它們之間的關系、以及影響融資系統的環境因素這四個方面;第二部分,分析融資理論,認為中小企業取得融資成功的關鍵因素是:企業能力上的適應性、信息不對稱的控制和風險與收益的權衡;第三部分,論證融資管理,認為有效融資管理需要回答十個問題:需不需要融資Being based upon the modern economy ' s new characteristic, through the analyzing of the traditional theory about the distribution of the residual control rights and residual claim of the firm, this paper discusses the residual control rights " distribution among the providers of the firm capital. then, the paper analyses the theoretical foundation, mode and nature of human capital participating in the distribution of the residual returns
本文立足於當代社會經濟的新特點,通過對傳統的企業剩餘控制權分佈和剩餘收益分配理論的剖析,探討新的知識經濟條件下企業的剩餘控制權在不同資本提供者之間的分佈特點,並以此為基礎,分析人力資本參與企業剩餘收益分配的理論基礎及其方式和特點。In sum, the core viewpoint of stakeholder theory can be concluded that the firm is a nexus of relationship among stakeholders, whose responsibilities and obligations are formed through explicit contracts and implicit contracts. the residual rights of the firm are distributed symmetrically, separately and unbalancedly among asset owners and human recourse owners in order to create wealth for its stakeholders and the society
總而言之,利益相關者理論的核心思想可以歸結為:企業是其利益相關者相互關系的聯結,它通過各種顯性契約和隱性契約來規范其利益相關者的責任和義務,並將企業剩餘權在企業物質資本所有者和人力資本所有者之間進行非均衡地分散對稱分佈,進而為其利益相關者和社會有效地創造財富。In addition, the theoretical analysis of chapter 2 indicates that the fundamental bifurcation of the two theories focuses on the distribution of residual rights of the firm, which is a short for claim to residual and residual rights of control. the mainstream theory deems that residual rights of the firm should be centralized on asset owners symmetrically, but the stakeholder theory insists that it should be distributed symmetrically among asset owners and human recourse owners unbalanced
第二章的理論分析還表明主流企業理論與利益相關者理論的根本分歧在於:前者認為企業剩餘權(剩餘索取權和剩餘控制權)應集中對稱分佈於物質資本所有者,而後者認為企業剩餘權應非均衡地分散對稱分佈於企業的物質資本和人力資本所有者之中。分享友人