合作性博弈 的英文怎麼說

中文拼音 [gězuòxìngbóyì]
合作性博弈 英文
cooperative game
  • 合 : 合量詞（容量單位） ge, a unit of dry measure for grain （=1 decilitre）
  • 性 : Ⅰ名詞1 （性格） nature; character; disposition 2 （性能; 性質） property; quality 3 （性別） sex ...
  • 博 : Ⅰ形容詞1 （量多; 豐富） abundant; plentiful; rich 2 [書面語] （大） big; large Ⅱ動詞1 （知道得多...
  • 弈 : [書面語]Ⅰ名詞（圍棋） weiqi a game played with black and white pieces on a board of 361 crosses; ...
  1. This dissertation describes the present rusult of the theoretic researches on harbor & navigation economy system during the course of the constriction of international shipping center of shanghai. aimed at the research goal, combinational theory of competitive advantage is developed in this dissertation. which combines the theory of common competitive advantage combines the conglomerate economy, regional advantage and other concerned theories to analyze domino effect of finance, trade and economy caused by harbor & navigation industry in the center city ; the advantage theory of balanced game, which mainly studies how to achieve an effective result of balanced game among every parties, puts more emphasis on the research of collaboration and negotiation that have collective advantage to analyze the relationship between competition and collaboration among different harbor owners under different operating circumstances ; the advantage theory of the reciprocal d evelopment of the harbor and the ambient area is an important paresis, not only can it accomplish its own development goal but can also offer some developing opportunities for its counterparts and the two will endeavor together to construct the international shipping center

    本文在總結前人研究成果的基礎上，概述了上海國際航運中心建設中有關港航經濟系統的理論研究現狀，並針對本文的研究目標提出了競爭優勢組合理論，分別是一般競爭優勢理論? ?結合了集聚經濟、區位優勢等相關理論，以此來分析港航產業在金融、貿易、經濟中心城市的集聚經濟效應；均衡博弈的優勢理論? ?主要研究如何在各種利益團體之間達成一種有效的均衡博弈結果，側重於對合作博弈、協商機制等具備集體優勢的研究，以此來分析港口利益主體之間在不同經營環境下（民營化前後）的競協博弈關系；港區（港口與區域）互動發展的優勢理論? ?港口與區域的互動發展是國際航運中心建設的重要前提，雙方基於良性循環的共同發展在滿足自身發展目標的同時也為對方提供了發展機遇，並共同為國際航運中心的建設而作出努力。
  2. Thesis point out : agricultural product market information system construction lag behind on market for farm products construction, scale of market for farm products, institutionalized degree low grade factor influence market for farm products collecting and distributing and transmitting the function to information relatively. agricultural product stronger in price fluctuation, dependence and a low one getting dispersed, in the forming process of and the price of agricultural product : basic price form with market, producing area price can reflect person who consume - price etc. factor weaken price direction function of information. agricultural product supply and marketing chain does not cooperate in the play chess state that caused inside system reasonless behavior of participant and feedback mistake of message understand

    指出：農產品市場信息體系建設滯後於農產品市場建設、農產品市場的規模化、制度化程度較低等因素影響了農產品市場對信息的集散和傳遞功能；農產品價格較強的波動性、相關性和較低的離散性，以及農產品價格形成過程中：基礎價格形成與市場之外、產地價格不能反映消費地價格等因素弱化了價格信息的導向功能；農產品供銷鏈的非合作博弈狀態造成內部參與者的系統非理性行為和對反饋信息的錯誤理解。
  3. In this article, firstly the background of the textile trade conflicts within sino - us or sino - euro are introduced, thus learn that how to discern and dodge the foreign trade risks, how to choose the appropriate investment projects have already become one of the most important questions for exporting companies on foreign trade affairs well - known as high investment and high risk. so the main text makes a risk analysis qualitatively and quantitatively on a textile - exporting trading company from three angles of statistic 、 game theory and portfolio theory, which is the main content that we studied. firstly, the statistic article adopts data of the transaction closing price of the textile clothing index in shenzhen stock exchange at the end of each quarter as well as several other kinds of data reflecting the macro - economic changes, performs an empirical analysis of these data according to the theory of co - integration test 、 granger cause test and impulse response function of time series in economitric, and learn that the impact to ti is more obvious by the economic index reflecting local commodity price level and economic prosperity degree home and abroad, as well as the impact degree and the time lag degree, and knows the macro - economic risks faced by textile business enterprises ; after that by the game theory angle we analyze exactly the managing risks faced by one textile export corporation named beauty. from the game expansion chart the system arrangement between censor ways by exportation goal countries and exporting strategies by the exporting enterprises has been analyzed. involving the benefit assignment between them both the limited rounds and infinite rounds negotiations of cooperation games have been studied, and then country responsibility and the enterprise managing risks on foreign trade affairs and so on have been analyzed exactly ; in order to realize the investment multiplication in the certain degree to disperse the risk, the

    本文首先介紹了中美、中歐紡織品貿易爭端的來龍去脈，由此可知在涉外貿易這種以高投入、高風險著稱的行業里，如何甄別和規避外貿風險、如何選擇合適的投資項目已經成為外貿企業的首要問題。因此，正文分別從統計學、博弈論和投資組合三種角度對涉外紡織品貿易公司風險進行了定性和定量的分析，這也是本文的主要研究內容。首先，統計學篇選取了深圳證券交易所行業分類指數?紡織服裝指數（ ti ）每一季度末的交易收盤價和若干種反映宏觀經濟變化的指標，利用計量經濟學中時間序列的協整檢驗、 granger因果檢驗和脈沖反應函數等理論做實證分析，從而得知反映國內物價水平和國內外經濟景氣程度的經濟指標對紡織板塊上市值的沖擊比較明顯，且可知沖擊程度和時滯度，進而分析出涉外紡織企業所面臨的宏觀經濟風險;接著，從博弈論的角度具體分析一家紡織品出口公司（ beauty ）的外貿活動所面臨的各種經營風險，該篇從博弈擴展圖入手，分析了出口目的國審查方式與本企業出口策略之間的制度安排;並圍繞雙方的利益分配，研究了有限回合和無限回合合作談判博弈，然後具體論述了國家責任和企業涉外經營風險等問題;在一定程度上為了實現投資多元化來分散風險的目的，投資組合篇從經典的markowitz模型著手，在一些特定條件的限制下，給出了一個相應的投資組合模型。
  4. ( 2 ) the formation of the new - style aeco is analyzed by the methodology of game theory. the conclusion is that many fanners could form the aeco finally, if they mix long - term in an organization at the drive of individual ration and undergo the repetitious game. otherwise, the non - cooperative action must be punished, and the punishment can evolve into the informal organization such as commandment,

    結論是，在個人理性的驅動下，多人長期相處於一個組織，經過多次反復的長期博弈，不合作行為必然遭到「懲罰」 ，這種「懲罰」逐漸演變成戒律、倫理道德、風俗、習慣、家法（宗法） 、村規民約等非正式組織，最終形成農業經濟合作組織。
  5. Therefore starting from labor contracts ' attribute of social law, this paper tries to make it clear that liability for culpa in contrahendo can ' t copy the provisions of contract law, and using the method of game theory makes a feasibility analyses f obligations and responsibilities and causes the labor contract law in revision to clarify the liability for culpa in contrahendo and improve the deficiency in the signing stage of labor contracts

    因此，作者從勞動合同的社會法屬性出發，明確勞動締約過失責任不能完全照搬合同法的規定，並運用博弈論的方法對義務及責任進行可行性分析，使正在修訂中的《勞動合同法》明確勞動締約過失責任，完善勞動合同訂立階段的不足。
  6. Additionally, the author adopted the methods of game theory and optimal theory to analyze the following problems : the profit and cost of alliance, the methods of partner selection, the inequality of the partner ' s relationship, the indetermination caused by imperfect information, the optimal profit distrib ution among the partners and the defensive mechanism to the opportunism behaviors

    文章運用博弈論、優化理論等分析方法主要研究了選擇合作夥伴的方法、夥伴地位不平等性、不完全信息引起的不確定性、合作夥伴內部報酬最優分配和合作過程中夥伴的機會主義行為及其防範機制的模型化問題。
  7. The content of each part follow as : in the first chapter, as start point and base of the paper, this part focuses on the basic study of definition characteristic of no, and the existing base of no - e - commerce environment ; in the second one, this part studies the theory base of no comprehensively applying the theories of core competence competent strategy and transaction cost ; chapter three studies the no from the coordination of no, and gives the structure clarification and characteristic of no firstly, at the same time, put forward the concept of virtual enterprise cluster ; based on such conclusion, studies the model of no from life cyc organization level process and value chain, and operational mode ; in chapter four, a theoretical explanation was addressed on the above structure by modeling no with game theory and graphic theory ; in the fifth chapter, on the bases of analysis of no operational risks, coordination mechanism of no was studied by individually modeling the no without core and no with core, and then put forward the solution for coordination mechanism of no ; as an important component of coordination mechanism of no, chapter six explored some basic concept of trust and importantly put forward the way of how to build trust in no, especially investigated the supporting function of valid reputation mechanism of no for the trust building, importantly an operational method on building reputation mechanism and evaluation method in no were given ; the last chapter applied the conclusion of the paper to investigate the famous trade web - sunbu. com analyzed its shortcoming and gave the advices of developing

    全文共分為七章，主要內容如下：第一章作為全文的理論出發點和基礎，圍繞網路組織的定義、特徵以及網路組織生存基礎- -電子商務環境等方面對網路組織的基本概念進行了闡述；第二章綜合運用核心能力、競爭戰略和交易費用理論對網路組織產生的理論基礎進行闡述；第三章首先從組織協調的角度對網路組織進行了研究，給出了網路組織的結構，分類和特徵，同時並給出了虛擬企業群簇；然後在此基礎上分別研究了網路組織的生命周期模型、層次模型、過程模型、價值鏈模型，以及運行模式；第四章綜合運用博弈論、圖論的相關知識，通過構建網路組織的模型，對上一章所研究的網路組織結構的形成機理給出了一種理論解釋；第五章在分析網路組織運行風險的基礎上，分別建立無盟主網路組織的博弈論模型和有盟主網路組織的博弈論模型，詳細研究了網路組織的協調機制，然後給出了網路組織協調機制的解決方案；第六章作為網路組織協調機制的重要組成部分，本章在討論了網路組織中建立信任機制的必要性的基礎上，研究了網路組織信任關系的類型，提出了在網路組織中如何建立信任機制。
  8. For the sake that, the conclusion of the research is scientific and formidable, the research approach is benefited a lot from the work of new institutional economics, which is represented by ronald h. coase and douglass c. north, and especially have taken advantage from masahiko aoki ' s endogenous rules of the game theory. to the research tools, approach methods of the cooperative game theory, which are highlighted by self - enforcing agreements, are manipulated among the dissertation

    為了確保這種以合作為導向的組織管理研究的科學性和所得出結論的健壯性，本文在研究方法上吸收了ronaldh . coase和douglassc . north為代表的新制度經濟學派的研究方法，特別是青木昌彥（ masahikoaoki ）所提出的博弈內生規則分析方法；在研究工具上充分借鑒了1990年代興起的以可自我執行協議為代表的合作博弈的方法體系。
  9. A two - stage game model is proposed. with this model, the feasibility of the strengthening of cti through technology cooperation is confirmed, the conditions that lead to positive incentives are given, and the ways and routes that help to strengthen the cti is concluded

    建立了一個兩階段的博弈模型，論證了基於技術合作的企業技術創新能力強化的可行性，得出了正強化的條件並提出了企業技術創新能力強化的途徑和方法。
  10. The article analyzes the process of the international energy cooperation, the self - evolution of the intercourse institute through constructing evolutionary games model, then reveals the dynamic evolution path and the nonlinear characteristic of the international energy cooperation

    通過用演化博弈理論分析國際能源企業合作交往的過程以及交往規則的自發演化，對其動態演化過程進行深入的分析，可揭示國際能源合作的非線性特徵及其動態演化路徑。
  11. Meeting the demands of cross - organizations cooperation, supply chain management ( scm ) has become a focusing on cooperation, advanced, and innovational besinees management mode. this research focuses on coordination issues in operation process of established construcation supply chain ( csc ) by combining the reseach methodologies, such as theory analysis and case study, quantitive and qualitative, and hybriding multiple pricinples, such as operation research, game theory, and intelligent agent technology. considering the actual demands and characters of the construction industry, this research mainly includes five sections, i. e. csc coordination issues, formation mechanism of csc coordination, impacts of information sharing on csc operation, cooperative decisiona making mechanism of csc and csc supporting platform

    （ 2 ）運用交易成本經濟學和企業能力理論，從減少交易成本和提高企業能力兩個方面闡述建設供應鏈協調（合作）形成的內在動力，論述了供應鏈（管理）是建設管理應當選擇的最佳規制結構;分析了建設供應鏈運作中的「囚徒困境」 ，用聲譽模型（ kmrw ）和演化博弈理論中的模仿著動態（ replicatordynamic ）模型分析了建設供應鏈各參與方的合作與競爭行為，分析得出建設供應鏈各方採用合作戰略是保證建設供應鏈系統向合作方向演化及其穩定性的基礎;給出了建設供應鏈合作戰略制定與實施的主要內容和要求。
  12. The main outcomes, innovation and breakthrough in theory in this paper lie in the following aspects : 1, in the past economics lectures of applying game theory to analyze economic systems are mainly limited in the field of non - cooperative game, however, they have been originally extended to the field of cooperative game in this paper

    本文所獲得的主要結果、創新之處以及理論上的突破主要表現在以下幾個方面： 1 、以往的經濟文獻中利用博弈方法對經濟系統進行的分析基本局限於非合作博弈范疇之內，本文開創性地將對經濟系統的博弈分論文摘要析展到了合作博弈的范疇。
  13. Based on the cases analysis in chapter four, this paper divides the opportunism in franchising relationship into two parts : one is ex ante adverse selection and the other is ex post moral hazard. for the former, this paper suggests regulating the franchisor ’ s qualification and relevant information disclosure ; for the later, this paper suggests setting up “ reputation incentive mechanism ” and “ discredit penalty mechanism ”, or enhancing both parties ’ asset specialization

    契約前逆向選擇問題的治理可以通過特許方的資格審核和規范信息披露機制來實現;通過對特許雙方的博弈分析本文認為對雙方的契約后的道德風險問題的治理可以通過建立「信譽激勵機制」和「失信懲罰機制」 ，以及提高雙方合作的專用性等方式來實現。
  14. The research about games in which each players has a number of pure strategies and mixed strategies have come into being grown - up theories and methods. people have got many results with the mixed game with infinite pure strategy sets. for instance, it is well - known that there exists optimal mixed strategies in games which each player has a payoff function with a continual pure strategy set on the unit square ( consult [ 10 ] [ 11 ] ). g. owen has also discussed the existence of optimal mixed strategies in which each player has a payoff function with a discontinuous pure strategies

    局中人具有有限純策略集的博弈及混合博弈問題的研究已形成了較為成熟的理論與方法，具有無限純策略集的混合博弈問題也已被人們研究，如單位正方形上具有連續純策略支付函數的最優混合策略的存在性是眾所周知的事實（參見[ 10 ] 、 [ 11 ] ） ， g . owen還對具有非連續純策略支付函數的最優混合策略的存在性問題作了一些討論。
  15. Research emphases have been poured on the process of forming coalitions, allocation of payoffs among the members in coalitions in cooperative games, observing the differences between theory anticipation and practice and analyzing inevitability of these differences

    實驗的研究重點是合作博弈中聯盟的形成及聯盟中成員之間收益的分配方式，觀察實驗過程中理論預期與現實情況的差異，分析出現這種差異的必然性。
  16. Base on this, the thesis addressed the total food security concept ( tfs ) with normative study firstly ; then combined qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis, compared with many kinds of food security evaluation methods and the intellective bp - ann model, improved the heilig ' s evaluation matrix, constructed the total food security evaluation matrix ( tfs matrix ), analyzed grain - production, circulate and consuming all - sidedly ; at last, analyzed and compared with different modes that can realize our country food security, and studied the rationality and feasibility of food cooperative security further using the cooperative game model. the tfs pursuits sustainable grain production, stable and smooth grain circulation, fair and suitable grain consumption increase

    據此，本論文首先運用規范研究，提出全面糧食安全（ totalfoodsecurity ，以下縮寫成tfs ）的概念；然後將定性分析與定量分析相結合，比較了多種糧食安全評價方法及智能bp - ann模型，改進了黑利格評價矩陣（ heidi ' sevaluationmatrix ） ，構建了全面糧食安全評價矩陣（ totalfoodsecurityevaluationmatrix ，簡稱tfs矩陣） ，對糧食生產、流通與消費進行全面分析；最後分析和比較了實現我國糧食安全的不同模式，並應用合作博弈模型進一步探討了糧食合作安全的合理性與可行性。
  17. Go together with to send together to are excellent to turn a kind of to pursue to rationalize through the long - term development and quests of go together with and send form, its content lie in under the resources share principle the establishment business enterprise alliance. the business enterprise passes the communication and communicates, becoming the consensus gradually, in the mutual trust with each other the foundation of the benefit up, pass the integration of the level, perpendicularity, same profession, different industry, with the strategic alliance, be in conjunction with the combination, logistics together turn etc. the resources that the cooperation method share is limited, the integration that thus attain the logistics to go together with to

    本文以吉林省交通科技發展計劃項目「道路運輸業共同配送發展模式及關鍵技術研究」為依託，從汽車物流行業的swot分析入手，對汽車物流共同配送從概念、優勢、模式、組織方式等方面進行分析，並採用博弈論中的合作對策理論解決費用分攤機制問題，最後通過對一汽大眾入廠物流的實例分析，充分說明共同配送是一種提高管理水平，調動供需雙方積極性，貫通整個物流網路，實現資源有效整合的配送模式。吉林省汽車物流實行共同配送對于降低汽車產業生產流通成本具有重要的現實意義。
  18. Based on system theory, synergetics theory, regional economic theory, this article explores deeply high - tech industry ' s competitiveness of taiwan and fujian and synergic development of the regional industries by means of the integrations to theoretical research and positive studies, quantitative and qualitative analyses > and by synthetic applications of the models of systemic evaluation, co - operational game, synergetics and control

    本文以系統論、協同論和區域經濟理論為基礎，運用理論研究與實證分析並重、定性分析與定量分析相結合的方法，綜合應用系統評價模型、合作博弈模型、協同模型、控制模型等，堅持融合與突破，對閩臺高科技產業競爭力及其區域產業協同發展進行深入探討。
  19. In finitely repeated game, again taking pd as an example, player at the last round has no reason to cooperate just as in a one - short game

    在有限重復博弈中，只有當事人一方的行為或類型存在某種不確定性時，合作才能發生。
  20. We can draw the conclusion that stage games and repeated games. can not free themselves from the failure of cooperation, while the introdution of impetus and the estallishment of tto cooperation organization of their own accord are the road to the cooperation between farmers suitable for china

    結果表明：一次性博弈和重復博弈無法使農戶擺脫合作失敗的困境，引入激勵機制，成立農戶自願參加的合作組織是適合我國國情的農戶合作之路。
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