弈來 的英文怎麼說
中文拼音 [yìlāi]
弈來
英文
zh-hk-
Among these are a cowcatcher ( to protect straying cattle and people from oncoming trains ), the single penny postage idea for england, railway signals, the speedometer, ideas on game theory, system of signaling for lighthouses, a compendium of all manufacturing methods and engineering work in britain
其中有排障器（避免迷途的牲畜和人群被急馳而來的火車撞倒） 、在英國實施一便士郵資的建議、鐵路信號、速度計、博弈論的思想、燈塔信號系統，以及一份關于英國全部製造方法與工程作業的綱要。From a social perspective, credibility can help lower business costs as the party that is unable to obtain enough information will not be hurt if other involved parties are credit worthy
誠信能夠促進博弈中合作解的出現。能夠節約交易成本，克服信息不對稱而給交易帶來的不利，是一種交易的潤滑劑。But my focus was specially laid on the decision - making of investment under uncertainty and with competition, i first. extend the basic model of dixit & pindyck ' s by allowing the relevant parameter to be a random variable, then proposed an numerical example to show how to solve this model, i gave the algorithm and did the comparative static analysis, finally i developed a model of duopoly under uncertainty, considering the competition between the firms explicitly, using roa, i calculated the two firm ' s values respectively when they take different roles - to be leader or follower, and then checked the possible equilibriums
本文的重點是考察在同時存在不確定性和競爭的情況下，如何用實物期權的理論估算投資項目的價值，為此，文中發展了兩個模型，第一個模型是對dixit & pindyck的模型的擴展，它通過一個相關的隨機變量來考察競爭對項目價值的影響，但沒有考慮企業間的相互博弈，文中給出了一個例子詳細地說明了該模型的求解並做了敏感性分析；第二個模型是一個不確定情況下的雙寡頭模型，文中給出了用實物期權方法計算的兩企業在處于領導者和跟隨者兩種不同境況時的價值，並將企業間的相互博弈考慮在內，考察了可能的均衡狀態。In opinion of economics, on the basis of coase problem and north problem, with the compositive method of microcosmic analysis and game analysis, established a non - dominium conception framework, further more, established agame analysis framework, on the basis to research native social structure change in shunt time
本文從經濟學角度出發，在反思「科斯悖論」與「諾斯悖論」基礎上，運用綜合的微觀分析方法與博弈分析方法，建立了不完全所有權的概念，並在此基礎上建立了一個博弈分析框架，來研究我國轉軌期的社會結構變遷。Institutional investor is a market part who is developping and extending, with the expanding of it ' s scale, it wil become from shareholder negativism to institutional shareholder activism, however, between the institutional investors, another problem exists, that is, who is responsible for supervision, a cock game model which describes the supervision of institutional investors is used in this chapter to inspect the institutional investors " behaviour mode in the situation of supervising cost and return is not symmetric
機構投資者是一個正在發展和壯大的主體，隨著其規模的擴大，會從早先的股東消極主義發展到股東積極主義，但是，機構投資者之間也存在誰去監督的問題，為此，本章採用了一個機構投資者監督侵權行為的斗雞博弈模型，來考察監督的成本和收益的不對稱情況下的機構投資者行為模式。This dissertation describes the present rusult of the theoretic researches on harbor & navigation economy system during the course of the constriction of international shipping center of shanghai. aimed at the research goal, combinational theory of competitive advantage is developed in this dissertation. which combines the theory of common competitive advantage combines the conglomerate economy, regional advantage and other concerned theories to analyze domino effect of finance, trade and economy caused by harbor & navigation industry in the center city ; the advantage theory of balanced game, which mainly studies how to achieve an effective result of balanced game among every parties, puts more emphasis on the research of collaboration and negotiation that have collective advantage to analyze the relationship between competition and collaboration among different harbor owners under different operating circumstances ; the advantage theory of the reciprocal d evelopment of the harbor and the ambient area is an important paresis, not only can it accomplish its own development goal but can also offer some developing opportunities for its counterparts and the two will endeavor together to construct the international shipping center
本文在總結前人研究成果的基礎上，概述了上海國際航運中心建設中有關港航經濟系統的理論研究現狀，並針對本文的研究目標提出了競爭優勢組合理論，分別是一般競爭優勢理論? ?結合了集聚經濟、區位優勢等相關理論，以此來分析港航產業在金融、貿易、經濟中心城市的集聚經濟效應；均衡博弈的優勢理論? ?主要研究如何在各種利益團體之間達成一種有效的均衡博弈結果，側重於對合作博弈、協商機制等具備集體優勢的研究，以此來分析港口利益主體之間在不同經營環境下（民營化前後）的競協博弈關系；港區（港口與區域）互動發展的優勢理論? ?港口與區域的互動發展是國際航運中心建設的重要前提，雙方基於良性循環的共同發展在滿足自身發展目標的同時也為對方提供了發展機遇，並共同為國際航運中心的建設而作出努力。By combining herd behavior and market manipulation or game behavior, we establish a dynamic game model of incomplete information between market rigger and market follower and analyze
接著將從眾行為與市場操縱結合起來，建立了市場操縱者和市場追隨者之間的不完全信息動態博弈模型，分析了市場操縱與博弈行為對股票市場泡沫的影響。In this article, firstly the background of the textile trade conflicts within sino - us or sino - euro are introduced, thus learn that how to discern and dodge the foreign trade risks, how to choose the appropriate investment projects have already become one of the most important questions for exporting companies on foreign trade affairs well - known as high investment and high risk. so the main text makes a risk analysis qualitatively and quantitatively on a textile - exporting trading company from three angles of statistic 、 game theory and portfolio theory, which is the main content that we studied. firstly, the statistic article adopts data of the transaction closing price of the textile clothing index in shenzhen stock exchange at the end of each quarter as well as several other kinds of data reflecting the macro - economic changes, performs an empirical analysis of these data according to the theory of co - integration test 、 granger cause test and impulse response function of time series in economitric, and learn that the impact to ti is more obvious by the economic index reflecting local commodity price level and economic prosperity degree home and abroad, as well as the impact degree and the time lag degree, and knows the macro - economic risks faced by textile business enterprises ; after that by the game theory angle we analyze exactly the managing risks faced by one textile export corporation named beauty. from the game expansion chart the system arrangement between censor ways by exportation goal countries and exporting strategies by the exporting enterprises has been analyzed. involving the benefit assignment between them both the limited rounds and infinite rounds negotiations of cooperation games have been studied, and then country responsibility and the enterprise managing risks on foreign trade affairs and so on have been analyzed exactly ; in order to realize the investment multiplication in the certain degree to disperse the risk, the
本文首先介紹了中美、中歐紡織品貿易爭端的來龍去脈，由此可知在涉外貿易這種以高投入、高風險著稱的行業里，如何甄別和規避外貿風險、如何選擇合適的投資項目已經成為外貿企業的首要問題。因此，正文分別從統計學、博弈論和投資組合三種角度對涉外紡織品貿易公司風險進行了定性和定量的分析，這也是本文的主要研究內容。首先，統計學篇選取了深圳證券交易所行業分類指數?紡織服裝指數（ ti ）每一季度末的交易收盤價和若干種反映宏觀經濟變化的指標，利用計量經濟學中時間序列的協整檢驗、 granger因果檢驗和脈沖反應函數等理論做實證分析，從而得知反映國內物價水平和國內外經濟景氣程度的經濟指標對紡織板塊上市值的沖擊比較明顯，且可知沖擊程度和時滯度，進而分析出涉外紡織企業所面臨的宏觀經濟風險;接著，從博弈論的角度具體分析一家紡織品出口公司（ beauty ）的外貿活動所面臨的各種經營風險，該篇從博弈擴展圖入手，分析了出口目的國審查方式與本企業出口策略之間的制度安排;並圍繞雙方的利益分配，研究了有限回合和無限回合合作談判博弈，然後具體論述了國家責任和企業涉外經營風險等問題;在一定程度上為了實現投資多元化來分散風險的目的，投資組合篇從經典的markowitz模型著手，在一些特定條件的限制下，給出了一個相應的投資組合模型。Firstly, by an in - depth study on chinese commercial banking and their foreign counterparts, this paper points out the great differences of intermediate business innovation between chinese and western commercial banks regarding innovation products variety, scale, technology, etc. secondly, comparing the institution regarding intermediate business innovation and microeconomic - body behavior of chinese commercial banking with foreign ones within an analysis framework from the perspective of institutional economics and game theories, this paper shows that a number of reasons account for the emerging of intermediate business innovation, including external economic environments as well as internal factors within the financial system and technology, among which the institutional factors within the financial system being the most important. at the same time, by comparison with western developed countries " counterparts, the innovation of chinese banking institution lags far behind the development of banking business in main aspects of property rights, managerial system, compensation arrangement and organization system. thus, the backward innovation of banking institutions and twisting microeconomic - body behavior seriously strict intermediate business innovation
本文首先通過對中外商業銀行進行較為深入的調查研究指出，與西方發達國家商業銀行相比，我國商業銀行中間業務創新無論是在業務創新品種、規模上還是在技術手段上，都存在著巨大差距；其次，運用制度學分析和博弈分析框架將中外商業銀行中間業務創新制度及微觀主體行為進行比較得出：商業銀行中間業務創新產生的原因有多種，如外部經濟環境因素、金融體系內部因素和技術因素等，其中最根本的是金融體系內部的制度性因素；與西方發達國家商業銀行制度相比，我國銀行制度創新遠遠落後于銀行業務的發展，主要表現在產權制度、經營制度、分配製度和組織制度等方面；銀行制度創新的滯后及其微觀主體行為的扭曲嚴重製約著中間業務創新，尤其是我國銀行產權關系不明晰，在國有獨資產權框架下政府? ?行長及上級行長? ?下級行長兩種委託代理行為帶來了嚴重的問題，導致了我國銀行中間業務創新動力不足。The paper analyzes comparatively interior transaction cost of integrated model with analysis structure of r. h. coase and market transaction cost of market model according to bargain proceeding ; analyzing economy of scales for electricity industry on the terms of its definition coming up with an improved " survival of the fittest " method to find optimum economic scale and explaining " separation of power plant from electric network " with the view of vertical economy ; studying selection and realization for valid competition of electricity industry with theory of contestable market, while setting up a oligarch monopoly competition model for the electricity market based on tax control of government with the thought of dynamic game theory of
應用科斯的交易成本分析框架對一體化管理模式下的內部交易成本進行分析，按照契約過程對市場化模式下的市場交易成本進行分析，並作了相應比較；按照規模經濟的定義對電力產業的規模經濟性進行了分析，提出改進的"適者生存法"來確定電力產業的最優經濟規模，並運用縱向經濟的觀點解釋"廠網分開" ；應用可競爭性理論研究了電力產業的有效競爭方式的選擇和實現，同時借鑒stackelberg模型的動態博弈思想，構建了基於政府稅收調控的電力市場寡頭壟斷競爭模型，通過對模型的分析說明了市場結構的演化和政府管制的必要性。This article examines the necessity and feasibility of the existence of court mediation by employing cost theory, utility theory, and game theory
本文試圖從經濟學的角度，分別使用成本理論、效用理論和博弈論來論證和檢驗調解制度存在的必要性和可行性。We can also change the result through changing the game rule
還需要通過對博弈規則的改變來影響博弈結果。On one hand, though there are lots of discussions on government debt in china nowadays, systemic studies on government debt issuance management are rather few. the paper makes a positive attempt in this aspect. on the other hand, some quantitative models applied in the paper, such as overlapping generation model on sustainable scale of government debt, linear regression model on current scale of government debt in china and game theoretical model on bond auction, contribute to clarification and efficiency of argumentation greatly
通過以上各方面的討論，本文主要體現出兩個方面的特點：一方面，盡管近年來學術界有關國債問題的專題研究已有不少，但是對發行管理進行的系統考察至今尚不多見，本文則在這方面進行了有益的嘗試；另一方面，在研究方法上，本文力求通過模型方式和計量手段的運用使有關結論有一個更為堅實的基礎，例如：在討論適度國債規模存在機制時運用的世代交疊模型、在實證分析我國國債規模時運用的多元回歸模型以及在研究國債招標制度時運用的博弈論模型等，都是這種努力的體現。However, if an ideal organization form is to be a rational choice of involved agents, it should be a nash ' s equilibrium at least. the government, the regulation and supervision organizations of cpa profession should guide accounting firms " choosing of the organization forms through the change of rules or the players " pay - off of the game
但理想的組織形式要成為相關利益主體的理性選擇，它至少應是一定經濟環境下的一個納什均衡，政府及注冊會計師行業監管部應通過改變博弈規則或相關利益主體的收益函數來引導會計師事務所組織形式的選擇。You fight in business field, play gaming in wisdom field, climb up and down in life field, when you go back home, it is naturally joyful and warm, rippling in upper - class ' s living space
生意場上來回拼殺，學識場上來回博弈，人生場中上下攀爬，回到家裡自然的快樂的溫存的，蕩漾于上流生活空間內。Hill works carved a son, mountain pines seem temple high and larking quaint, two man in the fishing boat had a leisurely game, the two face a fine of small streams, inside a bird using flooding removable white jade carved independence, and allowing full fine, talented and very likable, but also reminds one of only envy is not bred envy cents fame
作品精雕一座山子，山間蒼松翠柏，寺塔高築，俊秀古樸，兩位老翁在漁舟中悠閑地對弈，兩人面前一個精緻的小溪流，裏面一隻大鳥巧用透水白獨玉摘雕出來，體形飽滿精緻，十分討人喜歡，更讓人想起只羨鴛鴦不羨仙美名。Game theory are relevant for the understanding of cooperative strategy in liner shipping strategic alliances
所以，利用博弈論來理解、分析班輪運輸戰略聯盟是合適的。The motive of their behaviors originates from their strong concern for their own property rights, which must be exchanged on the basis of equal value. this is a game process proceeded under a " passive mechanism " ? he principal - agency mechanism
行為動力來源於高管人員對自己所擁有的產權的強烈關心，必須是「等價交換」 ，這是一個博弈的過程，在委託代理機制這樣一種「被動機制」下完成。As far as the form of city norm is concerned, it is the results of value structure, accumulation results and culture evolution. from the game theory point of view, city norm is an ideal balance of interests among actors. and it is a result of collective selection from the perspective of public selection
規范從本質上表現為一種文化，從城市規范的形成來看，規范是價值結構、累積因果和文化演進的結果；從博弈論的角度來看，理想狀態的城市規范是城市中的各種利益主體長期利益博弈所達成的均衡；從公共選擇角度來看，城市規范是城市中的各種利益主題集體選擇的結果。Then descript the business development condition and regulation failure phenomenon, include : interconnection conflict, expense confusion & price - war, policy bureaucracy, service low - grade, imperfect regulation rules etc. from above generalizes the three difficult questions which cause the regulation failure in telecom business of our country : faint concept comprehension in interconnection fair profit allocation. lack creditability in regulation promise and benefit group influent regulation decision. i will apply gambling theory and methods to analyze the questions in follow chapters
進而運用經濟博弈理論與方法對此分別進行了深入分析，包括利用公平獎勵組合模型來探討互聯互通利益分配的結算比例，構建規制機構與運營商之間的擴展形博弈來分析規制承諾的必要性以及利益集團對規制決策的影響，得出了一些有益的結論。分享友人