約束博弈 的英文怎麼說

中文拼音 [yāoshùbóyì]
約束博弈 英文
constrained game
  • 約 : 約動詞[口語] （用秤稱） weigh
  • 束 : Ⅰ動詞1 （捆; 系） bind; tie 2 （控制; 約束）control; restrain Ⅱ量詞（用於捆在一起的東西） bundle;...
  • 博 : Ⅰ形容詞1 （量多; 豐富） abundant; plentiful; rich 2 [書面語] （大） big; large Ⅱ動詞1 （知道得多...
  • 弈 : [書面語]Ⅰ名詞（圍棋） weiqi a game played with black and white pieces on a board of 361 crosses; ...
  • 約束 : keep within bounds; restrain; bind; bound; boundage;tie; restraint; restriction; engagement; repr...
  1. In the second part, on the basis of the explanation to the scope of the two kind of improper developing activities, the author focuses on the diseconomy of exterior environment of this kind of activity. the third part mainly discusses the activity motivation of government and investor in different stages of the developing and constructing activity, which are the entry motivation, the exit restriction, and the mutual decision - making in the repairing period

    第三部分：通過對政府和投資商兩個行為主體的分析，研究了風景名勝區「錯位開發」和「超載開發」的形成原因，同時借用博弈論的分析方法，探討了政府與投資商在修復風景名勝區開發誤區過程中的決策互動。第四部分：通過前兩個部分的分析，筆者在這一部分嘗試性的構建了風景名勝區開發的約束機制。
  2. Secondly, actions between banks and enterprises in china ' s credit market and the motivation of banks " deregulation are deeply analyzed by the means of the game theory. thirdly, the thesis studies how systematic factors in china aggravate the information asymmetry in the credit market from the aspects of property right, financial supervision and information announcement. at last, suggestions on how to dissolve the bank credi t risk and prevent non - performing banking assets increasing are put forward in the aspects of improvement of information symmetry, establishment of incentive and constraint mechanism and elimination of systematic factors which aggravate the information asymmetry

    首先，論文分析了我國信貸活動中的信息不對稱所產生的逆向選擇與道德風險對銀行資產質量的影響；其次，作者運用博弈論方法對我國信貸市場中銀行與企業的博弈行為以及銀行違規的動力進行了深入地分析；接著，論文又從產權、金融監管和信息披露這三個方面研究了我國的體制性因素如何加劇信貸市場的信息不對稱問題；最後，論文從提高信貸市場的信息對稱度、建立有效的激勵約束機制以及消除加劇信息不對稱的體制性因素這三個方面對化解我國銀行信貸風險、防範銀行不良資產的新增提出了建議。
  3. This paper carries out study on corporate governance based on system theory, advances concept of corporate governance, analyzes and abstracts system core of corporate governance from the point of mechanism by means of study on environment energy - rank principle, running mechanism and model of corporate governance. this paper analyzes mechanism of stimulation and restraint by using game theory, verifies effect of stock right structure on efficiency of corporate governance in view of connection between capital and corporate governance, gives method of resolving optimum stock right limit of collection and deconcentration and adventure share model of blending capital, and discusses problem of entrance of stakeholders to corporate governance etc. at last, according to system theory of corporate governance studied, this paper analyzes governance system of chinese state - owned and its effective factors, and advances complete countermove idea of corporate governance system

    本論文以系統理論為基礎對公司治理結構進行了研究，提出了公司治理結構系統的概念，分析提煉出了公司治理結構系統核，並通過對公司治理結構系統環境、系統能級原理和系統運行機制與模式的研究，從機制的角度分析了公司治理結構系統運行模式；運用博弈論對公司治理過程中的激勵約束機制進行了分析；針對資本結構與公司治理結構的關系，運用模型驗證了股權結構對公司治理效率的影響，給出了求解最佳股權集散度的方法和融資風險分擔模型；探討了利益相關者介入公司治理結構的問題等等。
  4. The behave and harm of insider control in state enterprise is discussed. the reason of insider control is analysed, me chain of consign and the lack of proprietor the unmatching of residual control and proceeds ; the deficiency of inspiring with manager ; the disfigurement of supervision and restriction etc are the reasons of insider control. the advice of controlling insider control is discussed from the angle of game theory, and think that big shareholders of enterprise have more power to supervise operator. in order to settle the question of insider control, the bestiring and inhibiting of manager should be consolidated. the superiority of employees in enterprise is emphasized in controlling insider control. the paper puts forward a new model to measure intrinsic value of human capital of manager, the compenhensive valuation metrix to decide the efficenncy of management and performance adjustment of human capital of manager

    這是本文研究的意義所在。本文論述了我國國有企業內部人控制問題的表現和危害，比較了我國國有企業與國外企業的內部人控制問題的差異及特點。在分析委託代理鏈冗長及所有者缺位、經營者剩餘控制權和剩餘收益權不匹配、對公司經理人員的激勵嚴重不足、監督約束機制不健全等是形成國有企業內部人控制的主要原因的基礎上，從博弈論的角度探討控制內部人控制問題的政策建議，認為股權集中的大股東有更強的動力去監督目標公司，解決內部人控制問題在於強化對經理人員的約束、激勵。
  5. As a supplement of the incentive and restraint mechanism, it can effectively supervise and regulate the exercise of power, and reduce the irresponsible behaviors of the operator. all of our analysis and the corresponding conclusions in this paper are based on the following theories : ( 1 ) the principal - agent theory, all of the problems are discussed in the framework of this theory ; ( 2 ) the incentive and restraint theory, is one of the main theoretical basis of our actual incentive and restraint mechanism ; ( 3 ) the summary of administrative accountability system, including the origin, meaning and constituent elements of it, which are the basis of our defining the meaning and the elements of the enterprise

    全文分為五個部分，主要內容是:論文相關的理論綜述;對我國現行激勵約束機制的現狀分析，指出了其中存在的主要問題;問責制與激勵約束機制的比較分析，並提出了將問責制引入企業的設想;關于經營者背責行為的模型分析，分別運用數學、經濟學和博弈的方法，討論了背責行為發生的條件和影響因素;明確了企業問責制的構成要素，闡述了實行經營者問責制的積極意義，並提出了具體的對策構想。
  6. On the basis of primary analysis in economic theory of the reasons of shanxi merchants taking credit widely in business, the thesis using game theory which is a new method does some careful research. then it spreads out further to analyze the mechanism from idea and moral, the administrative measures and property right restrain. because of the excessive loan, especially the credit prombles of qing government " s, shanxi merchants declined rapidly. modem enterprises are a link in historic chains and their credit and development have the same causes and effects as shanxi merchants. the research into the success and failure of shanxi merchants has great practical significance and it can provide some beneficial enlightenments for the development of enterprises today

    本文在運用經濟學理論對晉商在經營中廣泛採用信用的原因進行初步分析的基礎上，運用博弈論這一較新方法對其進行了細致的研究，進而從理念道德、管理措施和產權約束三個方面對其生成機制展開了深入探討。由於後期放貸過大等原因，尤其是清政府信用中的一系列問題，對晉商的衰敗起了推波助瀾的作用。現代企業是焊接在陳陳相因的歷史鏈條下的一環，其信用與發展之間有著與晉商基本相同的因果關系。
  7. But because of the asymmetric information and the transaction costs, the parties " opportunism behavior will be destined to lead the transaction to fail

    但由於信息不對稱和交易成本的存在，外界約束需要成本，一次博弈註定會因為當事人的機會主義行為導致交易失敗。
  8. The restriction from the third party and in moral changes the payment of two parties and then their strategy choice is changed, pareto improving realized

    來自外界的第三方約束和來自道德的軟約束改變了博弈雙方的收益，進而改變當事人的戰略選擇，實現帕累托改進。
  9. This part provides the basic model of principal - agency and summarize extend model of principal - agency through introducing the development of agent problem, principal - agency relationship and theory hypothesis and so on. in the chapter three, in which establishes an incentive - constrain mechanism game model. the chapter four, in which analyzes the manager action of state enterprise, rebuilds the incentive - constrain mechanism of manager of state enterprise

    本文分為五部分:第一章為緒論，詳細介紹了該學位論文的目的、研究的理論意義及現實意義、研究的方法、研究的思路以及本文的創新之處;第二章為委託?代理理論的概述，該部分主要從代理問題的產生和發展、委託?代理關系、理論假設前提等幾個方面給出了委託-代理理論的基本框架以及應用於現實中的擴展模型;第三章為建立激勵約束機制數學博弈模型;第四章為對國企經理行為特徵進行深層探析，重建國企經理激勵監督約束機制。
  10. The main innovation points in this thsis are as follows : ( 1 ) action of personal supply of water - saving irrigation technology according as ways of magrginal analysis has been studied ; ( 2 ) systems of encouragement and punishment by the way of game theroy in farmers " technology supply has been investigated ; ( 3 ) the form of agricultural water price depend on welfare analysis has been studied ; ( 4 ) the affecting factors of farmers " water - saving irrigation technology choices by econometrics has been analyzed

    本研究有以下創新： （ 1 ）依據灌溉技術的經濟特性，運用微觀經濟學的邊際分析方法研究了灌溉技術的低度私人自願供給行為和灌溉技術的過度利用行為。 （ 2 ）運用信息經濟學中的博弈論方法考察了建立激勵機制和約束機制在農產灌溉技術供給中所起的積極作用。 （ 3 ）運用福利分析方法對農業水價形成進行了理論分析。
  11. By applying the evolution game theory and replicated dynamic equation, evolutionary game models of individual housing credit without restriction and evolutionary game models of individual housing credit with restriction are constructed

    博弈雙方的得益是完全信息的，根據進化博弈理論和復制動態機制，建立了無約束條件下個人住房信貸進化博弈模型和有約束條件下的個人住房信貸進化博弈模型，並深入分析住房信貸市場的進化規律。
  12. According to the analysis of the reasons of equity financing preference, we know that the preference phenomenon is a rational choice of the listed company and control shareholders and managers. as we analyze in the paper, at present, the listed companies of our country has a preference of equity financing that is also a rational decision when the behavior bodies, such as the listed companies, the control shareholders ( esp. forbidden circulation shareholders ) and the managers, face with cheap equity financing cost, low efficient corporate governance structure and capital market

    我國上市公司股權融資偏好在表面看來是一個有悖于發達國家資本市場一般規律的而發生於我國資本市場的一個奇特現象，但通過對其成因的探討后，我們發現股權融資偏好實際上是上市公司、股東或經理等行為主體，對其所面臨的環境約束的最優選擇和反應，是各種經濟主體在追求自己的利益最大化的情況下一個必然的博弈均衡。
  13. The game result is mainly determined by following factors, including the advantages of shareholders, their attitudes to risks and ability to bear risks, the concentration of internal shareholding structure, the restraint of property right, the external formal and informal institutional arrangements and the distribution conditions of enterprise financial governance

    其中不同的利益相關者擁有的優勢、利益相關者的風險偏好及承擔風險的能力、企業內部股權結構的集中程度及產權約束程度、企業外部正式與非正式制度安排和企業財務治理中財權配置狀況是決定企業財務利益取向這一博弈結果的主要因素。
  14. A game theory analysis of independent incentive and restraint by board of directors in china

    我國獨立董事激勵約束機制的博弈分析
  15. In the course of investment games played in higher education, the expected income is only a necessity for deciding whether the game players invest or not. the influential factors for the genesis of dominant results of non - paleto in the investment games process, are, to a large extent, the choosing and building investment motivation based on various psychological expectancy. apart from social security, income allocation, liquidity limitation and regional difference. it ' s a important factor from uncertainty psychological expectancy include peoples " psychological expectancy for future uncertainty resulting from current changes of chinese system and continuous high - income expectancy derived from the nature of higher education ' s store of value

    在高等教育投資博弈過程中，即期收入只是決定博弈各方投資與否的必要條件之一，影響高等教育投資博弈非帕累托最優結果產生的因素，很大程度上在於市場選擇和建立在種種心理預期基礎之上的投資動機；而影響心理預期的因素除了社會保障、收入分配、流動性約束、地區差異等以外，中國目前制度變遷造成的人們對未來不確定性的心理感受預期和高等教育「價值儲蓄（ storeofvalue ） 」本性帶來的持久高收入預期也是重要方面。
  16. In order to achieve expected objection of m & as and realize the optimization of resources allocation, it must meet the simulative and limited requirements in m & as game model. at the same time, strategic m & as is not a simple zero - added game, but a process in which both are winner, it should be subject to the general law of investment, that is to say, strategic m & as need think about risk, earning and cost overall

    要達到並購的預期目標，實現資源的優化配置，就必須滿足並購博弈模型中的激勵約束條件；同時，戰略性並購不是簡單的零合游戲，而是一個雙贏過程，其必然符合投資學的一般規律，即綜合考慮風險、收益與成本。
  17. When putting structure of corporate governance into game analysis of earning managements, we found that the structure of corporate governance is a key institution factor affecting efficiency of earning managements. out - of - balance structure restrains the formation of efficient earning managements, and stimulates the generation of opportunistic earning managements. structure of corporate governance in balance can restrain opportunistic earning managements, and stimulates efficient earning managements in order to arrive to pareto efficiency equilibrium, governances of earning managements should be oriented as corporate governance, and include

    把公司治理結構引入盈餘管理的博弈分析，我們發現:公司治理結構是影響盈餘管理效率的關鍵制度因素;失衡性治理結構抑制效率型盈餘管理形成，刺激機會主義盈餘管理產生;制衡性治理結構能夠有效地約束機會主義盈餘管理，激勵效率型盈餘管理達到帕累托最優均衡;盈餘管理治理應以公司治理為導向，具體包括激勵效率型盈餘管理和約束機會主義盈餘管理兩個方面。
  18. So, any kind of theory is not all - powerful. we should persist in studying comprehensive management dialectically with the development of society. in short, there are three aspects which we should pay attention to in the article. firstly, as a main side of criminology, we do realize the importance of exploring the regularity of anticrime. secondly, the anticrime idea which conforms to game regularity is not narrow sense but broad sense. finally, we say, acqucring initiative in the anticrime field is the basis of the maximum benefit of preventing crime

    第五部分，以對預防犯罪現象的整體博弈分析為基礎，對綜合治理預防論進行了重新認識：指出，綜合治理預防犯罪論是符合預防犯罪規律的理性選擇；預防為主是綜合治理預防犯罪論的價值取向，而預防為主的實現是以提高犯罪人的犯罪機會成本並使其產生社會性的認知效應為主線的；綜合治理預防論的運用是以建立一定約束形式的預防原則為前提的；預防犯罪博弈的開放性、博弈參與者對各自利益尋求的本性決定了綜合治理預防論並非完美的預防理論，隨著社會的發展和變化，綜合治理預防論在預防觀念上也應有一個變化過程。
  19. This thesis has offered new definition to entrepreneur ' s concept, compensation ' s concept at first, then analyzed the quantity and. structure of entrepreneur ' s compensation under the studying frame of game theory in terms of human capital, finally comparatively analyzed the quantity and structure of entrepreneur ' s compensation, and compared entrepreneur ' s external tied mechanisms, such as product market, capital market, manager ' s market, between u. s. a., japan and china

    本文首先對企業家概念、薪酬概念給予了全新的界定，接著從人力資本的角度在博弈論的研究框架下對企業家薪酬的水平和結構進行了分析，最後比較分析美國、日本、中國等三個國家企業家薪酬的水平和結構，同時也對產品市場、資本市場、經理人市場等企業家外部約束機制進行比較。
  20. How to establish an effective incentive - constrain mechanism for an agent of the enterprise ? in this article, based on ready reference and research, we provide incentive - constrain game model of agent with game theory on condition that the information is incompletion between principal and agent. in this way, the incentive - constrain mechanism for manager of state enterprise is established

    如何建立有效的企業代理人激勵約束機制，本文在現有文獻和已有研究成果的基礎上，採用博弈論的方法來分析代理人的行為，建立了不完全信息下代理人行為激勵約束博弈模型，建立中國國企經理激勵約束機制。
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