games theory 中文意思是什麼

Politics is a game taking the distributing public power as a key content ; the essential difference between political theory and political philosophy is that the political theory studies the running laws of power games, but the political philosophy studies the legitimacy of games laws of public power ; a tradition of justice in classical western political philosophy has been shaped, the tradition of tiandao in classical chinese political philosophy is corresponding to it

摘要該文認為政治就是以公共權力分配為核心內容的游戲；政治學與政治哲學的根本區別在於政治學研究權力游戲規則的運行規律，而政治哲學則研究權力游戲規則的合法性；古典西方政治哲學所形成的是一種正義傳統，而它正與中國古典政治哲學的天道傳統相呼應。

According to some basic principle and basic standpoints of the information economics and the game theory, that the substance of process of the listed company profits dividend which is the intertexture of two " faultiness information dynamic games ", the first game is between the listed company managers and the share - holders, and the latter is among the investors

根據信息經濟學和博弈論的一些基本原理和基本觀點，上市公司利潤分配問題實質是上市公司管理層和公司股東之間，投資者之間兩個交織在一起的「不完善信息動態博弈」的過程。

The founders of game theory, the hungarian mathematician john von neumann ( one of the fathers of the computer ) and the austrian economist oskar morgenstern, collaborating in princeton in the 1940s, used parlor games such as poker and chess for illustrating their ideas

1940年代，博弈理論的創始人馮諾曼（匈牙利數學家，其中一位電腦之父）和摩根斯坦（奧地利經濟學家） ，在普林斯頓大學共同以撲克牌和西洋棋等桌上游戲說明了他們的想法。

According to previous work suggesting that event interest, risk constraint, and financial constraint will affect potential attendees ’ desire to attend and their sense that it is feasible to attend, this paper makes use of the confirmatory study to establish the theory construct, and confirms it in the empirical study. the significance in theory and its implication for. 2008 beijing olympic games are proposed finally. main conclusions of this paper are : event interest and constraints fully mediated the effects of motives and background on respondents ’ sense that it was feasible for them to attend. financial constraint did affect desire to attend. the desire to socialize and eustress had direct and positive effects on interest in the event and the desire to attend the event. results suggest the value of segmented sport event marketing that appeals to both travel and fan motives. in the last, this paper, according to the results of this research and the holding experiences of the successive olympic games, from the angle of special tourism events marketing, puts forward some olympics tourism strategies, for example destination branding marketing strategy, and emphasizes some advertent problems in olympic tourism marketing works, aims to pose some rational propositions for the operation of olympics tourism marketing

以往的研究表明事件吸引力、風險限制因素、財務限制因素都會影響潛在參與者渴望參與的程度以及對于參與可實行性的感知，基於此，本文採用驗證性研究方法，首先建立理論架構，然後在實證研究中加以驗證，並提出了研究的理論意義及對2008年北京奧運會的現實意義和啟示。本文得出的主要研究結論包括:事件吸引力和人們對于限制因素的感知程度作為中間變量完全削弱了旅遊動機和潛在參與者背景對于參與奧運會旅遊可實行性的影響;財務方面的限制因素會影響人們參與奧運會的渴望程度;渴望社交和追求勵志性對事件吸引力和人們渴望參與奧運會的程度有一個直接和積極的作用和影響。研究結果還表明作為奧運會舉辦方，應該認識到體育事件市場細分的重要性。

In this article, firstly the background of the textile trade conflicts within sino - us or sino - euro are introduced, thus learn that how to discern and dodge the foreign trade risks, how to choose the appropriate investment projects have already become one of the most important questions for exporting companies on foreign trade affairs well - known as high investment and high risk. so the main text makes a risk analysis qualitatively and quantitatively on a textile - exporting trading company from three angles of statistic 、 game theory and portfolio theory, which is the main content that we studied. firstly, the statistic article adopts data of the transaction closing price of the textile clothing index in shenzhen stock exchange at the end of each quarter as well as several other kinds of data reflecting the macro - economic changes, performs an empirical analysis of these data according to the theory of co - integration test 、 granger cause test and impulse response function of time series in economitric, and learn that the impact to ti is more obvious by the economic index reflecting local commodity price level and economic prosperity degree home and abroad, as well as the impact degree and the time lag degree, and knows the macro - economic risks faced by textile business enterprises ; after that by the game theory angle we analyze exactly the managing risks faced by one textile export corporation named beauty. from the game expansion chart the system arrangement between censor ways by exportation goal countries and exporting strategies by the exporting enterprises has been analyzed. involving the benefit assignment between them both the limited rounds and infinite rounds negotiations of cooperation games have been studied, and then country responsibility and the enterprise managing risks on foreign trade affairs and so on have been analyzed exactly ; in order to realize the investment multiplication in the certain degree to disperse the risk, the

本文首先介紹了中美、中歐紡織品貿易爭端的來龍去脈，由此可知在涉外貿易這種以高投入、高風險著稱的行業里，如何甄別和規避外貿風險、如何選擇合適的投資項目已經成為外貿企業的首要問題。因此，正文分別從統計學、博弈論和投資組合三種角度對涉外紡織品貿易公司風險進行了定性和定量的分析，這也是本文的主要研究內容。首先，統計學篇選取了深圳證券交易所行業分類指數?紡織服裝指數（ ti ）每一季度末的交易收盤價和若干種反映宏觀經濟變化的指標，利用計量經濟學中時間序列的協整檢驗、 granger因果檢驗和脈沖反應函數等理論做實證分析，從而得知反映國內物價水平和國內外經濟景氣程度的經濟指標對紡織板塊上市值的沖擊比較明顯，且可知沖擊程度和時滯度，進而分析出涉外紡織企業所面臨的宏觀經濟風險;接著，從博弈論的角度具體分析一家紡織品出口公司（ beauty ）的外貿活動所面臨的各種經營風險，該篇從博弈擴展圖入手，分析了出口目的國審查方式與本企業出口策略之間的制度安排;並圍繞雙方的利益分配，研究了有限回合和無限回合合作談判博弈，然後具體論述了國家責任和企業涉外經營風險等問題;在一定程度上為了實現投資多元化來分散風險的目的，投資組合篇從經典的markowitz模型著手，在一些特定條件的限制下，給出了一個相應的投資組合模型。

Game theory began as the study of decision - making in competitive situations, like games

博弈論始於競爭狀況下的決策研究，例如游戲。

We think that the main contributions of the book is in two aspects : one is the revolution of some concepts such as utility theory, aximatization of game, extended game ; the other is the breaking through in zero - sum two - person games centered on minimax and corporation game centered on characteristic function. this was, in fact, the development and extension of von neumann ' s classic game paper of 1928. our research shows that these contributions were a pure new theoretical creation, rather than an

認為《博弈論與經濟行為》的主要貢獻有二個方面：一個方面是在效用理論、博弈的公理化、博弈的擴展形式等等概念上的創新，另一方面是在以極小極大值定理為中心的三人零和博弈理論和以特徵函數為中心的合作博弈理論上的創新，這些實際上主要是馮?諾伊曼對其1928年的經典博弈論文章的理論框架的發展和延伸

Researchers have drawn upon the theory of games.

研究人員引用了對策論。

As a main tool to deal with pursuit - evasion games, the differential game theory has developed very well for fifty years. however, it is difficult to apply the results in real air games

微分對策作為解決追逃動態對策問題主要工具已經經歷了近50年的發展，就其本身而言已經發展的相當成熟，但距實際應用還有一段距離。

The first part is based on modern theory of differential games of kind, and complexity of solving saddle point is avoided. the constructing of the barrier and the judgment of expected result is the key of the problem

第一部分基於現代定性微分對策理論，避免定量微分對策中復雜的求解鞍點過程，其關鍵在於構造界柵，確定期望結果是否能夠實現。

Camerer, ho, and chong. " a cognitive hierarchy theory of one - shot games and experimental analysis. " forth, qje

一次性博弈中的認知層次理論與實驗分析。第4版， 《經濟學季刊》 （下文簡化位qje ）

The chinese tanker investment is different from the world ' s parallelism, and give the main point of the thesis, how the government would act as chinese comparatively lower lever of tanker investment. in the second chapter, the author describes the technique of research - game theory, analyzes the element and character of the games in the policy - making of tanker investment. how can the government improve the effect of policymaking

在第二章中，筆者描述了本文的主要研究方法? ?博弈論的一般研究思路根據博弈論的基本理論，分析航運投資政策博弈的要素及特徵，隨后將博弈論的思想引入經濟政策分析，表明本文的研究手段是利用博弈分析工具，研究如何提高航運投資政策的效應。

Based on to the theory of edgar dale, this article expounds the importance of games in the early children ' s ' development, and made a few proposals on the early children games

摘要本文依據戴爾經驗之塔的理論，闡述了游戲對幼兒發展的重要作用，並提出了關于幼兒游戲的幾點建議。

Research emphases have been poured on the process of forming coalitions, allocation of payoffs among the members in coalitions in cooperative games, observing the differences between theory anticipation and practice and analyzing inevitability of these differences

實驗的研究重點是合作博弈中聯盟的形成及聯盟中成員之間收益的分配方式，觀察實驗過程中理論預期與現實情況的差異，分析出現這種差異的必然性。

After introducing some basic concepts of agent 、 mas and multi - agents learning, the thesis analyses the research actuality and the future developmental directions of rl and multi - agent rl ( marl ). furthermore, the theory and related learning algorithms of them are briefly introduced. on the basis of analyses of pursuit game, aimed at the individual action learner, the thesis extends the rl algorithm for single agent, proposes the macrl - cc algorithm. finally, aimed at the joint action learner, a team - stochastic - games - based ( tsgs - based ) framework for multi - agents cooperative rl is defined

文章首先介紹了agent和多agent系統、以及多agent學習的一些基本概念，然後介紹了強化學習和多agent強化學習的研究現狀和未來發展方向。第二部分對強化學習理論和多agent強化學習理論進行了簡要介紹。在對pursuitgame問題進行初步分析的基礎上，針對獨立行為學習者，擴展了單agent強化學習演算法，提出了基於承諾和約定的多agent協同強化學習方法macrl - cc 。

Evolution and the theory of games

博弈的演變和理論

John von neumann ( pronounced : noi - mahn ) and oskar morgenstern linked the theory of games with economic activity more than sixty years ago

約翰?馮?諾依曼和奧斯卡?摩根斯特恩在六十多年前就開始將博弈論帶入經濟運作。

Analysis of stakeholders management by evolutionary games theory

利益相關者參與公司管理的進化博弈分析

Subsequently, improving efficiency hypothesis of control rights transferring and its theoretical model were mainly pointed out. in part 3, from the beginning of behaving and mechanism of control rights, macro welfare effect and micro economical efficiency were analyzed. returns distributions models and returns being expropriated games model in time of imperfect information and boards independence and ceo being monitored game model were chiefly studied in views of games theory in order to rec eiving the theoretical answers of relate principal parts conducts and results

筆者從控制權的形成和機理的角度出發，剖析了控制權變更的宏觀福利效應和微觀經濟效率，重點是應用博弈論剖析了控制權變更過程中的收益分配模型、收益侵佔的不完全信息動態博弈模型、董事會獨立性和總經理控制權監督的博弈模型，對控制權變更過程中各相關主體行為及其結果從理論角度求解。

Applying two - class price discrimination not only increase manufacture ’ s profit, but improve consumer ’ s welfare. this paper based on the theory of two - class price discrimination, as the point of view of manufactures, use games theory as tool, compares the two model of economy ’ s manufacture ’ s profit, that is cournot and stackelberg, when they applying two - class price discrimination

本文在二度價格歧視已有的理論基礎上，從廠商的角度出發，以博弈論為工具，研究了兩個經濟模型:古諾模型和斯塔克爾伯格模型，在應用了二度價格歧視后廠商的利潤的變化。