契約風險 的英文怎麼說
中文拼音 [qìyāofēngxiǎn]
契約風險
英文
contract risk-
Paper on the risks of key recovery, escrow, etc
有關密鑰恢復、契約等風險的文章。Optimal insurance contracts under particular moral hazard
道德風險情況下的最優保險契約模型Game analysis of preventing moral hazard and contract design
防範道德風險的博弈分析和契約設計In the main body, it firstly analyzes the microscopically mechanisms of vc ' s engender - contract mechanism, which is also the basic system of vc ' s further development. with other analytical tools like company bonds, corporation shares, the formation of venture investment ( vi ) contracts and relative breaching problems in the asymmetric information environment are also discussed
本文以理論文獻綜述部分引領全文，首先分析了風險資本形成的微觀機制基礎? ?契約機制，利用了企業債券、股權等作為分析工具，研究了不對稱信息下，多金融工具框架體系中的風險投資契約形式及違約問題，這是風險資本形成的機制基礎。Those issues discussed in contract economics such as agency cost, incentive problems, moral hazard, adverse selection and free - rider problem, etc., all appear in the process of venture capital investment
契約經濟學所論述的代理成本、激勵問題、道德風險、逆向選擇、搭便車等，在風險投資過程中都會出現。In chapter 9 we summarize the whole paper, and explain the shortages of this paper and problems to further study. main conclusions of this paper are as follows : the first, state - owned funds have always been predominant in venture capital sources in china, and this caused the " government - operated model " which leads to excessive government ' s interferes and distorted venture capital contracts ; the second, limited partnership contract is better than incorporated company contract, because the former has obvious advantages in not only encouragement and controls, but also in investors " profits. however, this paper insists, incorporated company contracts will still be very popular in the near future because limited partnership still be illegal in most provinces of china ; the third, venture capitalists " share of profits in compensation clause of fundraising contracts is influenced by investors " attitude towards difficulties and obstacles of future investment
本文研究的主要結論：第一，在我國風險資本來源中，政府風險資本一直居於主導地位，這造就了我國風險投資的「官辦官營」模式，使其契約機制從一開始就帶有「行政干預」的烙印；第二，有限合夥契約在約束機制、激勵機制、投資者收益三個方面都明顯優于公司制契約，因此是我國風險融資契約的發展方向，但由於有限合夥在我國受到法律限制，公司制契約在一定時期內仍是我國風險融資契約的主要形式；第三，融資契約報酬條款中的激勵系數受主體先驗概率影響，借鑒有限合夥契約，可對我國公司制融資契約進行改造與重構；第四，與債權契約、普通股契約相比，可轉換優先股契約可以有效緩解風險投資過程中的信息不對稱、降低代理成本，因此是我國風險投資契約的最優選擇。Because of non - systemic information, we should escape the moral risk by proper contract, they design many programs of the bank - firm restitution ; the role that the bank exercised on the firm is completed by debt constraint, and the bank influences the government construction of the firm by debt rights. the bank directly gives capital support to firms, and analyses the firms " ability of returning debt, and the bonding value, and make the load - decision
主要研究在信息不對稱情況下，如何通過完善契約來防範道德風險；銀企債務重組的設計；銀行對企業治理的作用的實現方案，即通過債權影響公司的治理結構，直接插手評價企業的經營狀況、投資決策、償債能力，以及分析企業的抵押價值並以之作為放貸決策的前提。Banks have started lending to them with worryingly easy - going covenants, which give lenders scant power to intervene if a loan risks going bad
銀行已經開始通過簽署另人擔憂的隨和的契約來放款，這使得放款人在貸款風險惡化的時候缺乏干預的能力。The design of incentive contracts about syndication in venture capital
風險資本聯合投資的激勵契約設計3. feasibility analysis of mbs the paper introduces and explains the theory of mbs and analysis the feasibility of mbs in china from many aspects, such as system, laws, financial environment, the situation of housing markets, macroeconomic effect, etc. the reform of land - using system provides mbs system pre - requisite ; the interrelated laws offer the law guarantee for mbs ; the issue of " security act " indicates that the security market of china is being normalized, and the developing prospect of finance in china brings mbs effective support ; the dilemma between the surplus and the shortage of commercial housing gives mbs an important turning point ; the macroeconomic effect of mbs is that it accelerates the economy, reduces the pressure of currency inflation, dissolves the operating risks of finance organs and makes the finance system operate steadily
三、我國住房抵押證券化的可行性分析本文從住房抵押貨款證券化（ mbs ）的理論分析入手，結合我國住房抵押貸款的發展狀況，分別從制度、法律保障、金融環境、住房市場現狀、宏觀經濟效應等幾方面論述了mbs在我國的可行性：土地使用制度改革為實施mbs提供了制度前提；配套法律制度為實施mbs提供了法律保障； 《證券法》的正式出臺，標志著我國證券市場走向規范，我國良好的金融業發展前景為mbs提供了有效的支持；現階段住房市場的有效供給與有效需求雙重約束的矛盾存在，為證券化實施提供了重要契機； mbs的宏觀經濟效應在於拉動國內需求，促進經濟增長，減輕通貨膨脹壓力，化解金融機構經營風險，保持金融體系穩定運行。Since 1980s, the risk investment was the focus of the attention of the economic academic community in developed countries especially in u. s. a. not only the basic theory of the indenture economics, information economics and the agency by agreement shows the operational mechanism of the risk investment, but also the means of the experience and empirical analysis are used to study the risk investment ’ s positive affection to the development of the high - tech industry and economy
本文在系統梳理風險投資基本理論與國內外研究進展的基礎上，對美國風險投資的發展歷程及影響因素、風險投資資金來源與風險投資機構的組織形態、風險投資機構的決策過程、風險投資機構與創業企業的契約關系、風險投資的退出途徑等問題展開了具體分析。並且以風險投資對象企業? ?高科技創業企業的治理結構為實例，剖析了以知識經濟為背景的企業權力轉移論，對有關假說進行了經濟學理論與經濟現實相結合的批判。This paper ， from related document exposition ， i get the hint of staging investment about capital structure contract and establishes a more simple model ， in each stage of venture enterprise ' s quit ， have designed the optimal equity proportion contract between venture capitalist and entrepreneur ， through raising the effort level of entrepreneur reduce informational asymmetries ， and reach conclusion : in first stage ， the equity proportion of venture capitalist optimal fraction is 0. 5 ， in the following stage ， the equity proportion of venture capitalist tends to increase
本文從相關的文獻論述中得到關于資本結構契約設計和分階段投資的啟示，建立了一個比較簡單，易操作的模型，在風險企業退出前的各階段，設計了風險資本家和企業家之間的最優的股權比例契約，通過提高企業家的努力程度來降低信息不對稱下的道德風險，並得出結論：在投資第一階段，風險資本家的股權比例最優解是1 / 2 ，以後的各階段，風險資本家的股權比例趨于增加。This agency issue of investor and venture capitalist can be effective to guard against the morals hazard of venture capitalist by limited partnership system ; venture capitalist can guard against the morals hazard of entrepreneur through contract ， which is optimal capital - structure contract in financing decision ， is combining to equity fraction ， stock design and staging finance ， in order to make enterprise financing cost minimum ， profit maximum ， it is minimum that informational asymmetries " level fall to
在投資者與風險資本家這一級委託代理關系中，有限合夥制可以有效防範風險資本家的道德風險；風險資本家可以通過與風險企業訂立契約來防範第二級代理問題? ?企業家的道德風險，即在融資決策中尋求最優的資本結構契約，在這種契約中結合股權比例，證券組合，分階段投資等方法，以使企業融資成本最低、收益最大，信息不對稱程度降到最小。Based on the cases analysis in chapter four, this paper divides the opportunism in franchising relationship into two parts : one is ex ante adverse selection and the other is ex post moral hazard. for the former, this paper suggests regulating the franchisor ’ s qualification and relevant information disclosure ; for the later, this paper suggests setting up “ reputation incentive mechanism ” and “ discredit penalty mechanism ”, or enhancing both parties ’ asset specialization
契約前逆向選擇問題的治理可以通過特許方的資格審核和規范信息披露機制來實現;通過對特許雙方的博弈分析本文認為對雙方的契約后的道德風險問題的治理可以通過建立「信譽激勵機制」和「失信懲罰機制」 ，以及提高雙方合作的專用性等方式來實現。The transferability of risk through the contract chain constitutes the main incentive for insiders to commit the crime
因為在公司契約連接中能夠轉嫁風險，一些內部人因而獲得了實施加害行為的主要動力。Executive compensation payment contract is critical in aligning the interests of divergent organizational groups, usually used to alleviate conflicts between corporation investors and managers and to reduce the moral hazard problems
企業經營者報酬支付契約的執行有利於協調經營者與出資人之間的這種利益「沖突」 ，從而減少經營者「道德風險」所帶來的危害。Due to the barrier of idea and institution, technology reform and economic development are not synchronous. for a long period of time, because of the unconnected financing channels, unsound contractual relationships, unreasonable distribution system and the undefined intellectual property rights, risk investment developed difficultly in our country. some corporations have even gone wrong and gone bankrupt at last
我國的風險投資業發展較晚，由於觀念及體制上的障礙，科技改革與經濟發展未能保持同步，長期以來融資渠道的不通暢、契約關系的不健全、分配製度的不合理、知識產權不明確等原因，致使我國風險投資事業舉步維艱，有些公司甚至誤入歧途，最終破產關閉。It has the important meaning for working for more and better economic results and realizing enterprise value maximization that how to improve contract, establish the system perfectly, normalize the behavior between owner and manager, prevent manager from adverse selection and moral risk, raise manager ' s ability and activity, reduce the proxy cost and so on
因此，如何完善契約、建立健全相關機制、規范所有者和經營者的行為、防止經營者的「逆向選擇」和所有者與經營者的「道德風險」 、提高經營者能力和激發經營者的經營積極性、降低代理成本等對提高企業經濟效益、實現企業價值最大化具有重要意義。This paper, from the aspect of enterprise contracts, tries to derive acting risk of the operator of modern corporation or enterprise resulting from incompleteness of contracts and etc, and on this basis elaborately analyze acting risk " reasons and expressional manners, and then via expounding current leading means controlling and decreasing acting risk of the operator of corporation or enterprise - stimulation mechanism and its restricting bottleneck, and consequently put forward more effective accounting restricting mechanism in the author " opinion - budgeting for the responsibilities of the operator of corporation or enterprise, and finally emphasize that, from the aspect of the investors of corporation or enterprise, the simultaneous implementation of budgeting for the responsibilities of the operator of corporation or enterprise and stimulation mechanism is just the necessary measure to take and will get twice the result with half the effort for controlling and decreasing acting risk of the operator
本文試著從企業契約的角度引出由於契約不完全等原因所導致的現代公司企業中經營者的代理風險，並在此基礎上詳盡地分析了其產生的緣由及表現形式，繼而通過論述目前控制和減小企業經營者代理風險的主要手段? ?激勵機制及其約束瓶頸，從而提出作者認為更加有效的會計約束機制? ?對企業經營者的責任預算控制，最後指出從企業投資者的角度來說對經營者的責任預算控制以及激勵機制的同步推進、雙管齊下是更應該採取的必要措施並且也能對控制和減小經營者的代理風險起到事半功倍的效果。On the contract risk and evasion of farmers ' production and operations
論農戶生產經營的契約風險與規避分享友人