比約內博 的英文怎麼說
中文拼音 [bǐyāonèibó]
比約內博
英文
bjornebo-
Firstly, by an in - depth study on chinese commercial banking and their foreign counterparts, this paper points out the great differences of intermediate business innovation between chinese and western commercial banks regarding innovation products variety, scale, technology, etc. secondly, comparing the institution regarding intermediate business innovation and microeconomic - body behavior of chinese commercial banking with foreign ones within an analysis framework from the perspective of institutional economics and game theories, this paper shows that a number of reasons account for the emerging of intermediate business innovation, including external economic environments as well as internal factors within the financial system and technology, among which the institutional factors within the financial system being the most important. at the same time, by comparison with western developed countries " counterparts, the innovation of chinese banking institution lags far behind the development of banking business in main aspects of property rights, managerial system, compensation arrangement and organization system. thus, the backward innovation of banking institutions and twisting microeconomic - body behavior seriously strict intermediate business innovation
本文首先通過對中外商業銀行進行較為深入的調查研究指出，與西方發達國家商業銀行相比，我國商業銀行中間業務創新無論是在業務創新品種、規模上還是在技術手段上，都存在著巨大差距；其次，運用制度學分析和博弈分析框架將中外商業銀行中間業務創新制度及微觀主體行為進行比較得出：商業銀行中間業務創新產生的原因有多種，如外部經濟環境因素、金融體系內部因素和技術因素等，其中最根本的是金融體系內部的制度性因素；與西方發達國家商業銀行制度相比，我國銀行制度創新遠遠落後于銀行業務的發展，主要表現在產權制度、經營制度、分配製度和組織制度等方面；銀行制度創新的滯后及其微觀主體行為的扭曲嚴重製約著中間業務創新，尤其是我國銀行產權關系不明晰，在國有獨資產權框架下政府? ?行長及上級行長? ?下級行長兩種委託代理行為帶來了嚴重的問題，導致了我國銀行中間業務創新動力不足。The paper analyzes comparatively interior transaction cost of integrated model with analysis structure of r. h. coase and market transaction cost of market model according to bargain proceeding ; analyzing economy of scales for electricity industry on the terms of its definition coming up with an improved " survival of the fittest " method to find optimum economic scale and explaining " separation of power plant from electric network " with the view of vertical economy ; studying selection and realization for valid competition of electricity industry with theory of contestable market, while setting up a oligarch monopoly competition model for the electricity market based on tax control of government with the thought of dynamic game theory of
應用科斯的交易成本分析框架對一體化管理模式下的內部交易成本進行分析，按照契約過程對市場化模式下的市場交易成本進行分析，並作了相應比較；按照規模經濟的定義對電力產業的規模經濟性進行了分析，提出改進的"適者生存法"來確定電力產業的最優經濟規模，並運用縱向經濟的觀點解釋"廠網分開" ；應用可競爭性理論研究了電力產業的有效競爭方式的選擇和實現，同時借鑒stackelberg模型的動態博弈思想，構建了基於政府稅收調控的電力市場寡頭壟斷競爭模型，通過對模型的分析說明了市場結構的演化和政府管制的必要性。The behave and harm of insider control in state enterprise is discussed. the reason of insider control is analysed, me chain of consign and the lack of proprietor the unmatching of residual control and proceeds ; the deficiency of inspiring with manager ; the disfigurement of supervision and restriction etc are the reasons of insider control. the advice of controlling insider control is discussed from the angle of game theory, and think that big shareholders of enterprise have more power to supervise operator. in order to settle the question of insider control, the bestiring and inhibiting of manager should be consolidated. the superiority of employees in enterprise is emphasized in controlling insider control. the paper puts forward a new model to measure intrinsic value of human capital of manager, the compenhensive valuation metrix to decide the efficenncy of management and performance adjustment of human capital of manager
這是本文研究的意義所在。本文論述了我國國有企業內部人控制問題的表現和危害，比較了我國國有企業與國外企業的內部人控制問題的差異及特點。在分析委託代理鏈冗長及所有者缺位、經營者剩餘控制權和剩餘收益權不匹配、對公司經理人員的激勵嚴重不足、監督約束機制不健全等是形成國有企業內部人控制的主要原因的基礎上，從博弈論的角度探討控制內部人控制問題的政策建議，認為股權集中的大股東有更強的動力去監督目標公司，解決內部人控制問題在於強化對經理人員的約束、激勵。As a supplement of the incentive and restraint mechanism, it can effectively supervise and regulate the exercise of power, and reduce the irresponsible behaviors of the operator. all of our analysis and the corresponding conclusions in this paper are based on the following theories : ( 1 ) the principal - agent theory, all of the problems are discussed in the framework of this theory ; ( 2 ) the incentive and restraint theory, is one of the main theoretical basis of our actual incentive and restraint mechanism ; ( 3 ) the summary of administrative accountability system, including the origin, meaning and constituent elements of it, which are the basis of our defining the meaning and the elements of the enterprise
全文分為五個部分，主要內容是:論文相關的理論綜述;對我國現行激勵約束機制的現狀分析，指出了其中存在的主要問題;問責制與激勵約束機制的比較分析，並提出了將問責制引入企業的設想;關于經營者背責行為的模型分析，分別運用數學、經濟學和博弈的方法，討論了背責行為發生的條件和影響因素;明確了企業問責制的構成要素，闡述了實行經營者問責制的積極意義，並提出了具體的對策構想。On the basis above, the paper sets a multiple evaluating index for the thermal environment, and then according to the critical transferring condition of the natural ventilation and the air conditioning in dwellings, the paper offers a " correction factor of energy consumption " to make a scientific and correct evaluation for the energy consumed by those sorts of buildings. further more, the author programmed the subprogram of thermal comfort results by fuzzy evaluation for the natural ventilation room so as to form an entire program, which could make it easy to numerically calculate the indoor thermal environment of residential buildings, and evaluate and analyze its thermal comfort as well features of energy conservation
西安建築科技大學博士學位論文利用熱環境定量化分析及舒適性評價計算程序，對夏季自然通風條件下建築特性與室內熱環境影響關系進行了定量化計算分析，得出在滿足冬季節約採暖能耗要求的前提下，合理組織自然通風是改善夏季室內熱環境的有效手段；以寒冷地區三個城市為例，對比分析了不同地區夏季自然通風的有效時數；結合實際測試分析，提出全面改善夏季室內熱環境的系統優化設計方法。分享友人