principal-agent problem 中文意思是什麼
principal-agent problem
解釋
委託代理問題-
Based on the principal - agent theory, this article is dedicated to find out the specialties about the principal - agent relationship in china state - owned listed company and discover the multitudinous principal - agent problem of financing. after above study, this article tries to construct a financing analytical framework according with the specialties of china state - owned listed company, then uses the framework to explain and forecast the financing practices
本文擬將從委託代理的角度分析我國國有上市公司的特殊性，找到國有上市公司在融資方面所存在的種種委託代理問題，從中試圖建立起我國國情下的融資分析框架，並用於解釋融資行為。 -
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical basis of the topic. this part introduces and comments on some typical theories on bank m & a, such as transaction cost theory, principal - agent problem and management theory, and diversification theory
第二章是關于研究主題的理論基礎，介紹了銀行並購的代表性理論：交易費用理論、代理問題及管理主義理論、多角化理論，並對這些理論進行了評述。 -
The transaction cost theory applies to vertical m & a to some extent. the principal - agent problem and management theory explains m & a from the respect of agent, while the diversification theory discusses the impetus of mixed m & a. chapter 3 analyzes the impetus and effects of bank m & a
其中交易費用理論在解釋縱向並購上具有一定的適用性，代理問題及管理主義理論從公司代理人問題的角度對並購提供了解釋，多角化理論可用於解釋混合併購。 -
This part provides the basic model of principal - agency and summarize extend model of principal - agency through introducing the development of agent problem, principal - agency relationship and theory hypothesis and so on. in the chapter three, in which establishes an incentive - constrain mechanism game model. the chapter four, in which analyzes the manager action of state enterprise, rebuilds the incentive - constrain mechanism of manager of state enterprise
本文分為五部分:第一章為緒論，詳細介紹了該學位論文的目的、研究的理論意義及現實意義、研究的方法、研究的思路以及本文的創新之處;第二章為委託?代理理論的概述，該部分主要從代理問題的產生和發展、委託?代理關系、理論假設前提等幾個方面給出了委託-代理理論的基本框架以及應用於現實中的擴展模型;第三章為建立激勵約束機制數學博弈模型;第四章為對國企經理行為特徵進行深層探析，重建國企經理激勵監督約束機制。 -
Then this dissertation studied the incentive mechanism and its influences to the enterprise ' s development in long - term. it shows that the expecting return of managers can be connected with the short - term and long - term performance so to make managers to focus on the enterprise ' s development in long - term. therefore, the incentive compatibility between shareholder and manager can be realized theoretically and to certain degree, the principal - agent problem can be solved
然後論文對股票期權制度的激勵機理及對企業長期發展的影響進行了研究，結論表明，股票期權制度將經理人期望收益同公司的近期、遠期績效同時聯系在一起，使得經理人在位期間有積極性注重企業的長期發展，在理論上實現了股東和經營者之間的激勵相容，在一定程度上解決了現代公司所面臨的委託代理問題。 -
The state as soe ' s principal makes an influence on the problem of incentive and constraint, which include not only the principal problem, but also the agent problem. the main effect is that : on the one hand, probably take the multiple goals into the firm ; on the other hand, do no good to prevent their collusion when the state entrusts the supervisor to supervise the manager
國家作為企業的委託人，使得對經營者激勵和約束問題中既包括代理人方面的問題，又包括代理人方面的問題，其所造成的主要影響是：一方面可能把國家的多重目標帶入企業；另一方面在委託監督人對經營者進行監督時不利於防止他們之間合謀行為。 -
On the principal - agent problem and the incentive - monitor system of the venture capital
論風險投資委託代理問題與激勵約束機制 -
So the problem of * principal - agent come into bring. part ii is the problem " s advance. by the analyses of three format of private enterprise, open out the property right " s problem each other
第二部分是問題分析，通過對我國私營企業並存的三種企業形式的具體分析，揭示出各自存在的產權關系問題，並對每個問題做出分析，也使最後部分的問題解決思路具有針對性。 -
Chapter 7 focuses on the principal - agent problem existing between enterprises inside a supply chain and proposes the solut ion
第7章討論了供應鏈節點企業之間可能存在的委託代理問題及其相應的解決措施。 -
On the principal - agent problem in the course of college policy management
大學政策實施中的委託代理問題分析 -
Due to the salary of manager is bound to the future stock price of the company, and accordingly, the short - term behavior of the manager can be avoided, and to certain degree, the principal - agent problem appeared after separating ownership from right of control can be solved. so to speak, stock option is a long - term incentive system based on the match of return and risk
由於股票期權將經理人的報酬與公司的遠期股票價格聯系和捆綁在一起，從而能有效地規避企業經營者的短期行為，並在一定程度上解決了兩權分離后企業產生的委託代理問題，是一種報酬和風險相匹配的長期激勵制度。 -
In chapter 2, the conception and the categories of principal ? gent problem, the framework of the principal ? gent theory, the reasons and the behavior of the principal ? agent problem in privately offered fund are introduced. it is mentioned that the decision for the investor is how to allocate his capital in asymmetric information
第二章簡單介紹了委託代理問題的概念和分類，介紹了委託?代理理論的分析框架，介紹了私募基金的委託代理問題的產生原因和表現，指出私募基金投資人的投資決策過程是一個信息不對稱的資金決策過程。 -
Study on the principal - agent problem in supply chain
供應鏈企業委託代理問題的研究 -
Study on the principal - agent problem in supply chain enterprises
供應鏈企業間的委託代理問題研究 -
Research on the principal - agent problem about the insurance agency market
保險中介市場的委託代理問題 -
Principal - agent problem of state - owned enterprises and its countermeasure
國有煤炭企業實施可持續發展戰略的障礙與對策 -
Principal - agent problem is one of the main risks in the operation of occupational pension schemes
摘要委託代理是企業年金運營中體現的主要風險之一。 -
Finally, this article provides some advices to control the principal - agent problem of financing
為達成上述的目的，本文主要分為下面幾個部分進行闡述。 -
The principal - agent problem omnipresent in modern corporations expedites the global corporate governance movements
現代公司廣泛的存在著委託? ?代理問題，由此催生了全球公司治理運動。 -
Thereinto, demand - oriented mechanism consists of demand - oriented mechanism in each enterprise and demand - oriented mechanism in the whole green supply chain ; green restriction mechanism consists of restriction of green design, green manufacturing and green logistics ; on cooperation mechanism, this paper expatiates the principal - agent problem among enterprises, and then researches cost saving distribution mechanism, negotiation mechanism, risk evading mechanism, information share mechanism and confidence mechanism
其中，需求拉動機制包括各節點企業內部的需求拉動機制和綠色供應鏈整體的需求拉動機制。綠色約束機制包括綠色設計、綠色製造和綠色物流方面的約束。關于綠色供應鏈各節點企業間的合作機制，本文首先闡述了綠色供應鏈環境下精益生產中企業間的委託代理問題，然後分別從利益分配機制、協商機制、風險防範機制、信息共享機制和信任機制等方面進行了研究。
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