bargaining theory 中文意思是什麼

bargaining theory 解釋
交易理論
  • bargaining : n. 1. 討價還價，議價。2. 交涉；契約。
  • theory : n. 1. 理論，學理，原理。2. 學說，論說 （opp. hypothesis）。3. 推測，揣度。4. 〈口語〉見解，意見。
  1. Escalation has conceptual affinities with bargaining theory.

    逐步升級同交易理論在概念上具有相似性。
  2. Secondly, the mixed h2 / h control is formulated as a game problem of incomplete information, a suboptimal 2x2 non - zero game model is constructed, where two channels are chose as players and h2 and h control are pure strategies, and an algorithm for mixed h2 / h control, which is based on the nash ' s bargaining theory, is derived to achieve the nash equilibrium point. finally, handling stability, ride comfort and steering handiness are related with vehicle suspension system and electrical power steering

    其次，基於對策論把h _ 2 h _混合控制問題抽象為兩個對局者信息不完全情況下的非零和博弈模型，在以次優范數值構造的2x2非零和博弈模型中把兩類通道作為參加博弈的兩方，以h _ 2和h _控制方案作為兩種純策略，基於納什談判解原理設計出求解h _ 2 h _混合控制問題納什均衡點的演算法。
  3. This paper is based on the industrial organization theory, and framed by the theory of " prompting the competition in one industry " ( michael e. porter ). among those five factors that are posed by porter to influence the competition in one industry, three factors are used in this paper to analyze the whole wine industry and one winery. they are : bargaining ability of buyers ( market ) ; bargaining ability of sellers ( materials ) ; competitive ability of present firms

    本文以產業組織理論為基礎，以邁克爾?波特「驅動產業競爭」的理論為基本框架，針對五種作用力中三種重要的作用力，即買方侃價實力（市場） 、供方侃價實力（原料）和現有公司間的爭奪，分別對整個葡萄酒產業和一個葡萄酒生產企業進行了分析，以找出影響行業市場績效和企業競爭力的因素。
  4. Forth, the thesis combines cooperation ’ s theory and bargaining theory to compare community cooperation, credit union with supply and marketing cooperation, and includes that new pattern professional cooperation is a valid choice to elevate the degree of farmers ’ systematization

    自90年代後期以來，隨著農產品供求關系發生根本性變化，中國農業發展不僅受到資源短缺的約束，而且越來越受到市場的影響，農產品賣難、價格下跌問題日益突出，農民增收困難。
  5. The connotation of farmers ’ systematization is : according to certain rules, principal part of organization adopts various modes to form small - scaled, disperse, puny farmers into powerful farmers and into equalization state to modern farmers. the thesis begins with status quo of farmers ’ systematization, make use of bargaining theory and theory institutional vicissitude, and analyze institutional vicissitude of farmers ’ systematization from three points : inducement, balance and efficiency

    農民組織化是組織主體依據一定的原則，採取不同方式將具有生產經營規模狹小、經營分散、經濟實力較弱、科技水平低等傳統職業特徵的農民轉變為有組織進入市場與社會，並且能夠獲得與其他階層同等待遇的現代農民的過程。
  6. ( 2 ) reviewing the investment tools in common use by venture capital fund, we analyses the reason to use equity investment tools. after we analyses ventures financial structure by information economics theory, we model an simple bargaining model. in this model we discuss the venture capital incentive mechanism under condition of uncertainty

    運用信息經濟學理論對創業企業的資本結構進行了剖析，構建了一個基於創業投資家（公司）與創業企業家的簡單交易模型，討論了關于創業資本產出不確定狀況下的補償機制。
  7. The simulation findings uncover that : either a higher inefficiency level of e - marketplace, or a higher opportunity cost that a seller in the traditional marketplace takes, or a low upper limit of active sellers in e - marketplace, or a higher probability of taking stochastic actions, or less information to form expectation, can be propitious for spurring the shift from the traditional marketplace to the e - marketplace. as for the popular “ thorough shift ” presumption, this paper puts forward that, an aggressive shift from traditional marketplace to e - marketplace is probably built on an effort by the buyer to constrain his own bargaining power or to share benefits with the supplier. by developing economic models and leveraging the general game theory, this paper also finds out that cost is the critical factor that governs the evolution of monopolistic market, monopolistic competitive market and oligarchic market

    保持其它因素不變，以上因素對市場演化的影響作用分別為:市場演化對電子市場競爭無效率度高度敏感，當電子市場競爭無效率度小幅度下降時，市場顯著地偏向傳統市場，當電子市場競爭無效率度小幅度上升時，市場顯著地偏向電子市場;傳統交易中賣方所承擔的隱性成本是市場演化的另一個決定性因素，當傳統交易中的賣方所承擔的隱性成本取值較大時，電子市場將佔主導地位，當傳統交易中的賣方所承擔的隱性成本取值較小時，傳統市場將佔主導地位， ;當為電子市場中實際參與每筆交易的賣方設置一個低的上限時，傳統市場將迅速演化為電子市場;市場參與者的非理性行動概率越大，市場越容易向電子市場
  8. In this article, we will compare different banking institutions, study an extensive literature on relationship lending, then explain the theory in the frame of neo - institutional economics systematically and with modeling demonstration. after specifying the costs, benefits and net - profit transfers, we will analyze the banks and firms " characteristics and surrounding factors subject to the participation and incentive constrains, finally draw our conclusion that : lending behaviors between banks and firms are diverse and always affected by the two parts " bargaining power, social environment or their cognition to the relation. we comment that smes and banks develop relationship lending which is prone to satisfy the participation and incentive constrains, and that relationship lending should be a feasible way of smes " financing

    本文將通過對各國銀企關系制度進行比較，就關系貸款命題對文獻進行廣泛調研，在新制度經濟學的分析框架下進行系統規范的理論闡述和模型證明，列舉關系貸款的預期收益、成本內容，對凈剩餘的租金轉移進行分析，在此基礎上研究使關系貸款滿足參與約束與激勵相容約束的銀行和企業特徵、制度環境因素，得出結論：各國市場環境下，銀行與企業之間的關系型融資有不同的表現形式，信貸行為受到銀企雙方談判地位、主觀認識的影響以及社會信用、經濟條件、制度背景等客觀環境的制約；中小企業和中小銀行之間的關系貸款安排易於滿足合約雙方的參與約束和激勵相容約束，不失為中小企業融資的一條可行途徑。
  9. The methodologies that will be applied in this claim include : game theory, western labor economics, labor law theory, economics of property right and institutional economics. the important experiences achieved by the western market economies with regard to collective bargaining and collective agreement mechanism will be used as a reference point, all the while maintaining a focus on the changes taking place in the field of labor relations during the transitional period in china. finally, several important problems involving progression to a proper operation of the collective bargaining and collective agreement mechanism will be fully addressed, with the intent of advancing this mechanism forward to a new stage, and thereby realizing a more harmonious, stable labor relationship in china

    本文將在分析市場經濟條件下集體談判和集體合同制度一般規律的基礎上，充分運用博弈經濟學、西方勞動經濟學等學科的研究成果，借鑒西方發達市場經濟國家處理勞資沖突的重要經驗，結合我國向市場經濟過渡過程中勞動關系發生的新變化，分別從勞動法學、產權經濟學和制度經濟學的多重角度論證在我國現實條件下加快推行集體談判和集體合同制度的特殊必要性，並針對當前實踐過程當中所存在的若干主要問題進行較為深入的分析，以期推動集體談判和集體合同制度在我國的順利實施和運行，促進利益協調性勞動關系在我國的實現。
  10. This book is for those who wish a thorough mathematical treatment circa 1990 of game theory, bidding and some bargaining problems

    此書是為那些想對大約1990年左右的博奕論、投標以及一些商談問題有十分精確理解的人而寫的。
  11. To study on the problem of large consumers " direct buying ( or plants " direct supplying ) has an important play on development and improvement of china electric power market. this dissertation makes use of the correlative theories and knowledge in game theory to study that problem including these strategies how to reduce or restrict rivals " market - power and how to obtain the maximal profit in course of quotation and bidding among rivals. three instances, one consumer ' s bargaining with multi generators, one consumer ' s bargaining with one generator, and multi consumers " bargaining with one generator, were analyzed

    本文利用博弈理論的相關理論和知識研究我國電力市場下電力大用戶直接購電（發電商直供）問題，探討我國電力市場中開展電力大用戶直接購電的必然性和可行性，研究各方在交易過程中，如何降低或限制對方市場力的策略、如何在與競爭對手在報價和競標博弈中獲得最大利益的策略，分析單一電力大用戶與多個發電商交易、單一電力大用戶與單一發電商交易、以及多個大用戶與單一發電商交易三種情況下的報價博弈，並給出具體交易報價模式、數學模型和算例分析。
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