管理層股東 的英文怎麼說

中文拼音 [guǎnlǐcénggǔdōng]
管理層股東 英文
management shareholder
  • 管 : Ⅰ名詞1 （管子） pipe; tube 2 （吹奏的樂器） wind musical instrument 3 （形狀似管的電器件） valve;...
  • 理 : Ⅰ名詞1 （物質組織的條紋） texture; grain （in wood skin etc ） 2 （道理;事理） reason; logic; tru...
  • 層 : i 量詞1 （用於重疊、積累的東西 如樓層、階層、地層） storey; tier; stratum 2 （用於可以分項分步的...
  • 股 : Ⅰ名詞1 （大腿） thigh; haunches 2 （機關、企業、團體中的組織單位） section of an office or enterp...
  • 管理層 : administrative level
  • 管理 : manage; run; administer; supervise; rule; administration; management; regulation
  • 股東 : shareholder; stockholder
  1. Buyers ( management ) can get profit from the raising of companies performance and the underestimated prices, avoid hostility acquisition, satisfy the needs of carving out business ; seller ( shareholder ) can reach the purpose of reducing agency cost, incent and restrict the management, peel off assets and change public - owned departments to private departments

    買方管理層可以獲得來自公司經營業績的提高和企業價值被低估的收益，避免被敵意收購，滿足創業的需要；賣方股東可以達到降低代理成本、激勵和約束管理層、剝離資產和公營部門私有化的目的。
  2. According to some basic principle and basic standpoints of the information economics and the game theory, that the substance of process of the listed company profits dividend which is the intertexture of two " faultiness information dynamic games ", the first game is between the listed company managers and the share - holders, and the latter is among the investors

    根據信息經濟學和博弈論的一些基本原理和基本觀點，上市公司利潤分配問題實質是上市公司管理層和公司股東之間，投資者之間兩個交織在一起的「不完善信息動態博弈」的過程。
  3. In fact, it is the special system of our country that increase the incoherence and unconditionally of all the stockholders and the lack of the true investors. these two elements increase the stockholders " dissimilated behavior. in dividend policy, the difference of payment level resulted from the variance of the controlling degree embodies not the difference of stockholders " decision making to increase the company " value but the particular preference of the nonnegotiable shareholders and the management

    而最根本的原因是由於我國特定製度安排導致了股東群體的非一致性和非制約性的強化以及真正投資主體的缺位，兩個因素的共同作用加劇了股東行為的異化，表現在股利政策上，由股權控制度變化產生的支付水平差異主要體現為非流通股股東及管理層的特殊偏好，而從質的角度，以公司價值為目標的真正股東化主體的決策差異分析無效。
  4. Successful transition requires both the old and the new generations effort to professionalize while preserving the core value of the business, and do it early rather than late. prof. fans study also suggested that the secrets of success for the second generation required a number of steps to quickly shore up trust and confidence in the new leadership

    因此，家族企業能否成功傳承實有賴新舊兩代領導人的努力，他們必須盡早將公司制度化及設法保存企業的核心價值。范教授的研究亦為家族企業第二代掌舵人提供了一些成功秘訣，他們必須采納一些措施，來迅速穩定新管理層的信任和信心，如成立獲股東信賴的董事局，提高公司透明度及增加股息。
  5. The idea of independence is generally fundamental to the nature of independent director, who in depend dent from major - share holder and the executive directors

    獨立董事的最基本特徵就在於其具有完全的獨立性，既要獨立於大股東，也要獨立於經營管理層。
  6. It takes agency theory as its premise, human resource property right as its core, and modern distribution theory and risk theory as its foundation. its basic idea is to give high - level managers headed by chief executive officer the right to purchase common stocks of the company at a certain price and time in the future. through this equity system, it ' s expected to inspirit organizations " management in the long run, avoid operators " short - term behavior, and thus reduce agency cost, improve organizations " management structure, and promote the stability of management, so that both constituents ( stake holders ) and vicegerents " ( operators ) targets of gaining profit will be realized finally

    其本質是對經營者的一種薪酬安排；它以代理理論為前提，以人力資本產權理論為核心，以現代分配理論和風險理論為基礎；其基本內容是給予公司內以首席執行官為首的高級管理人員在未來某特定的時間按某一固定價格購買本公司普通股的權力；通過這種機制希望對公司管理層起到長期激勵的作用，避免經營者的短期行為，從而減少代理成本，改善企業的治理結構，促進穩健經營，最終實現委託者（股東）和受託者（經營者）雙贏的目的；它是把期權理論應用於現代激勵機制的一種制度創新，比較符合市場經濟條件下企業經營者的價值取向和企業發展的戰略要求。
  7. The poll surveyed related senior executives, fund managers and analysts from nearly a hundred fund - management companies and brokerages in the asia - pacific region, uk and usa. they were asked to rate 313 companies in asia ex - japan on disclosure and transparency, responsibilities of management and board of directors, shareholders rights and equitable treatment, and investor relations

    是次評選由亞洲貨幣以問卷形式訪問英美及亞太區近百間基金管理公司的相關行政人員，基金經理及分析員，就亞洲不包括日本313間企業進行評選，評分標準包括資料披露及公司透明度管理層及董事局承擔股東權益及公平待遇，以及投資者關系等四大基準。
  8. Ranked no. 1 among the best companies for corporate governance in both asia and hong kong best for disclosure and transparency, best for responsibilities of management and the board of directors, best for shareholders rights and equitable treatment, and best for investor relations by asiamoney magazine

    獲財經雜志asiamoney評選為亞洲及香港最佳企業管治公司第一名最佳資料披露及公司透明度最具責任感管理層及董事局最佳股東權益及公平待遇以及最佳投資者關系。
  9. Ranked no. 1 among the best companies for corporate governance in both asia and hong kong best for disclosure and transparency, best for responsibilities of management and the board of directors, best for shareholders rights and equitable treatment, and best for investor relations by asiamoney magazine in 2006

    獲財經雜志asiamoney評選為2006亞洲及香港最佳企業管治公司第一名最佳公司資料披露與透明度最具責任感的董事局與管理層最佳股東權益及公平待遇以及最佳投資者關系。
  10. The main results indicate that the levels of executive pay are largely driven by firm size, not by firm performance, and equity - based compensation does not necessarily motivate managers to maximize shareholders ' wealth and improve firm performance, and moreover, the boards works inefficiently in designing compensation contracts for top managers

    主要結論表明香港上市公司的管理效用的水平主要由公司規模決定，而非公司的市場業績；同時以股份為工具的補償機制也不能有效促進管理層對小股東的利益和公司業績的關注，董事會也未能有效制訂對高級經理層的補償獎勵合約。
  11. This paper summarizes mechanism by which law and institution affect ownership governance : small shareholders incline to free - riding, while large shareholders have motility to monitor managers and motives to expropriate small shareholders

    本文從理論層面上總結了法律制度對股權治理的作用機理：小股東在公司治理中傾向于「搭便車」 ，大股東既有動力監督管理層也有動機對小股東進行掠奪。
  12. Buyers ( management ) can get profit from the raising of companies performance and the underestimated prices, avoid hostility acquisition, satisfy the needs of carving out business ; seller ( shareholder ) can reach the purpose of reducing agency cost, incenting and restricting the management, peeling off assets and changing public - owned departments to private departments

    買方管理層可以獲得來自公司經營業績的提高和企業價值被低估的收益，避免被敵意收購，滿足創業的需要；賣方股東可以達到降低代理成本、激勵和約束管理層、剝離資產和公營部門私有化的目的。
  13. It is necessary to perfect the laws and regulations about mbo and make it legislatorial. part is about the qualitative analysis of the management buy - out. mbo is one of the a & m measures that manager who loans money to buy stock shares of his own corporation so as to change the ownership structure of the corporation and gain anticipated interests

    本文首先對管理層收購進行定性分析，認為管理層收購是管理層利用自有資金或外部融資來購買其所經營公司的股份，以此完成由單純的公司管理者到股東法律地位的轉變並進而改變公司所有權結構、控制權結構的商事行為。
  14. For example, in china, mbo is more like an encouragement way than to reduce agent cost ; illegal financing channel causes latency problem for future operation ; management members make advantage of so - called " internal people control " to undervalue the share price that damage the interests of the middle - and - little share holders ; management members also obtain large proportion dividend from the company that limits its development

    比如說，國內mbo更多是一種激勵措施；融資制度不健全，管理層杠桿收購資金的來源不合法，導致了收購完成後的短期行為；不完善的資產定價體系、股權割裂導致管理層壓低凈資產，造成國有資產流失和損害中小股東的利益；由於流通股和非流通股同股不同價，管理層利用大比例分紅抽逃資金等等。
  15. Imposing service fees on small investors is in fact a prudent way of doing business, and it is also a sensible way for the banks to minimize losses. if a bank disregards all these considerations, its management is irresponsible and it fails their investors as well as customers

    向小存戶收取手續費，其實是穩健經營的手法之一，也是銀行不願做蝕本生意的求存之道，若非如此，銀行的管理層才是不負責任，有負股東和客戶。
  16. Will shareholders in investment banks ever grasp that they hold a weak hand versus the interests of executive management

    投資銀行的股東是否會明白，他們是在螳臂當車地與高級管理層的利益較量？
  17. Such events include mergers, takeovers, restructurings and recapitalizations, which are often undertaken by corporate managers trying to boost shareholder value

    類似的事件包括兼并、收購、重組及重新調整資本結構，這通常都是由於公司的管理層為了提高股東的收益而實行的。
  18. We also make empirical study on factors determining executive compensation structure, which include ownership characteristic, proportions of non - tradable share holders of different types, management structure, industry, size of firm and it ’ s performance. after analyze theoretically and empirically executive compensation problems in china ’ s listed company, this paper further to develop an approach to improving executive compensation structure

    同時，對影響管理層激勵因素的實證研究表明:上市公司所有者性質、不同類型的非流通大股東持股比例、管理層結構、行業特徵以及公司的經營狀況和規模是顯著影響管理層激勵的主要因素。
  19. Management will maintain its business focus and marketing thrust in the most cost effective manner, and strive to achieve profitability and create positive values for the shareholders within the shortest time

    管理層將會以最具成本效益之方法，繼續以現時之策略經營業務及提高市場佔有率，朝著盈利目標積極進發，在最短時間內為股東創造財富。
  20. Study suggests the main constraints of management buy - out : it ' s groundless to fix a price, the information published not confirm with regular standard, purchase procedure is not transparent, purchase action is not with market law, and also policy restriction. consequently, the paper put forward solutions to improve management buy - out : 1 ) the policy to evade the inside risk : the main way is to select suitable enterprises to develop management buy - out ; 2 ) to ensure the transparent and the market standard of the purchase procedure : the main point is to guarantee the justification of the purchase price, to strengthen the transparent of the information announcement ; 3 ) to consummate the mechanism of supervise government : which the work should be done in the supervise department of government ; 4 ) to emancipate the mind, decrease the government action in the enterprises purchasing ; 5 ) to care for the latter developing of the mbo, the purpose of mbo is to pursue the biggest profit of the enterprise ; 6 ) to consummate the environment of circulating necessary funds ; 7 ) to solve the funds and taxes problems of mbo, this is a better way to solve the problems of mbo

    一是管理層收購定價方面的法律依據不足：二是信息披露不夠規范，現階段運作或已完成的mbo案例在進行信息披露時尤其是披露其資金來源時多諱莫如深，令投資者對其資金來源皆產生懷疑；三是收購程序不透明，歸根到底也是法律方面的不足，缺乏相關的公正的運作程序和政策保障；四是收購行為非市場化，我國的管理層收購結束之後往往僅僅是相對控股，股票繼續交易，所有者與經營者分離的問題並沒有從根本上得到解決，所有權與經營權相統一的目標沒有達到，這就可能造成大股東也就是內部人侵吞中小股東利益將更為便捷；五是融資渠道潰乏，主要是國家政策和法律的障礙限制了mbo的融資渠道；六是服務市場不夠發達，主要是中介市場缺乏高素質的專業人才，無法滿足客戶進行mbo的需要，從而限制了mbo在中國的運行；七是政策限制，主要對合法的收購主體的限制、收購規模的限制、收購時點的限制以及收購資金來源的限制。
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